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THE AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE AND THE RISE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM
JaredA. Goldstein*
This Article launches a project to identify constitutional nationalism-the
conviction that the nation'sfundamentalvalues are embodied in the Constitution-as a
recurring phenomenon in American public life that has profoundly affected both
popular and elite understandingof the Constitution.It does so by examining the nearly
lost story of the American Liberty League and its failed campaign to defeat the New
Deal as an un-American and unconstitutional aberration. Like today's Tea Party
movement, the American Liberty League of the mid-1930s generated massive media
coverage by vilifying the President as a radical socialist who sought to foist unAmerican policies of "collectivism" on an unwilling public. In 1936, the Roosevelt
reelection campaign made the strategic choice to focus the campaign on the American
Liberty League because it made the perfectfoil for Roosevelt to present the New Deal
constitutionalphilosophy. Neglected in the large body of scholarship on the New Deal
constitutionalrevolution, the fight between the Liberty League and Roosevelt should be
recognized as a central episode of popular constitutionalism, in which the American
people were asked to choose between competing constitutionalphilosophies, both of
which were asserted to embody the nation's true values.
The Liberty League utterly failed to topple the New Deal-in fact, it may have
helped to generate a consensus in favor of the New Deal constitutionalphilosophy. Yet
the Liberty League crystallized the rhetoric and philosophy of constitutional
nationalism that has been at the core of a long line of political movements that have
challenged the modern state as fundamentally contrary to American values. The
American Liberty League is the prototype of later constitutionalnationalistmovements,
from the John Birch Society of the 1950s, Barry Goldwater Republicanism of the
1960s, the Posse Comitatus movement of the 1970s and 1980s, the militia movement of
the 1990s, and the Tea Party movement today, all of which have proclaimed as their
central goal the return to what each particularmovement identifies as the nation's true
constitutionalvalues and to reject all other values as dangerouslyforeign.

* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; J.D., University of Michigan, 1994; B.A.,
Vassar College, 1990. The author would like to thank the participants in the February 2012 conference,
"Popular Constitutionalism and the 2012 Election," held at Roger Williams University-Jack Balkin, Steven
Calabresi, William Forbath, Lawrence Solum, Ilya Somin, and Mark Tushnet-who offered valuable
comments on the presentation from which this article developed. The author would also like to thank his
invaluable research assistants Michael da Cruz and Andrew Fischer.
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INTRODUCTION

From its rather sudden creation in February 2009, the Tea Party movement has
been hailed as something new under the sun: a grassroots political movement focused
not on a single issue but on the Constitution itself.1 Tea Party supporters believe that
the nation is facing disaster because it has abandoned the true meaning of the
Constitution, and they declare that their central mission is to "take back the country" to
restore the Constitution. 2 Even liberal law professors who disagree with Tea Party
ideology have tended to welcome the movement because it encourages public
engagement with the Constitution, which they consider good for constitutional
3
democracy.
Far from novel, however, the Tea Party movement is merely the latest in a long
line of movements that have proclaimed the goal of returning to the nation's true
constitutional values and rejecting all other values as dangerously foreign. In ideology
and rhetoric, the modem prototype for these movements was the American Liberty
League of the 1930s, the first group to challenge the administrative state as an
unconstitutional and un-American aberration. 4 Like the Tea Party movement, the
American Liberty League generated massive media coverage by vilifying the President
as a radical socialist who sought to foist un-American policies of collectivism on an
unwilling public. 5 Little remembered today, the Liberty League was recognized by the
generation after its demise as "the root movement of... modem conservatism."' 6 Its
rhetoric and philosophy show it to be the direct antecedent of Barry Goldwater
Republicanism, the John Birch Society, the Patriot movement, and today's Tea Party

1. See, e.g., Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
193, 193 (2011) (describing how the Tea Party uses the Constitution as "the foundation stone of a campaign
designed to right the direction of a country believed to have gone astray"); Ilya Somin, The Tea Party
Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300, 302 (2011) (illustrating how
arguments adopted by the Tea Party movement stem from Constitutional mandates).
2. See, e.g., DICK ARMEY & MATr KIBBE, GIVE Us LIBERTY: A TEA PARTY MANIFESTO 66 (2010) ("First
and foremost, the Tea Party movement is concerned with recovering constitutional principles in
govemment."); JOSEPH FARAH, THE TEA PARTY MANIFESTO: A VISION FOR AN AMERICAN REBIRTH 27 (2010)
(arguing that the Tea Party's primary goal is to ensure that the constitutional limitations on the federal
government are strictly adhered to); About, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/about (last

visited Oct. 14, 2013) (declaring in its mission statement that the federal government must be limited to what
has been enumerated in the Constitution).

3. See, e.g., ANDREW E. BUSCH, THE CONSTITUTION ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: THE SURPRISING
POLITICAL CAREER OF AMERICA'S FOUNDING DOCUMENT 8 (2007) ("All other things being equal, more
constitutional rhetoric is better than less."); Adam Liptak, Tea-ing Up the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2010, at WKI (discussing how the Tea Party movement has centered the spotlight of public discourse on the
Constitution).
4. See generally GEORGE WOLFSKILL, THE REVOLT OF THE CONSERVATIVES: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE 1934-1940 (1962); Frederick Rudolph, The American Liberty League, 19341940, 56 AM. HIST. Rev. 19 (1950).
5. See, e.g., Carl W. Ackerman, The Test of Citizenship (July 16, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE
DOCUMENT No. 61, at 4 (declaring that the "object [of the New Deal] is a new social order based on
governmental control"); Raoul E. Desvemine, The Principles of Constitutional Democracy and the New Deal
(July 11, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 52, at 19 ("[The New Deal] is alien and foreign to
our constitutional philosophy. It destroys our American system and substitutes the European system.").
6. Eric F. Goldman, AllAgainst That Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,1962, at 6.
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movement. 7 Like these later groups, the Liberty League argued for a return to what the
movement identified as the fundamental national values of self-reliance, individualism,
hard work, property rights, and freedom from government-values the movement
8
believed identified with the Constitution.
What unites movements from the American Liberty League to the Tea Party
movement is an ideology best characterized as constitutional nationalism, the
conviction that the Constitution defines and embodies the nation's fundamental values.
It is a form of nationalism because it identifies a characteristic-adherence to principles
said to be found in the Constitution-that the movement declares define what it means
to be part of the national community. 9 Just as ethnonationalism defines the national
community by membership in an ethnic group, 10 constitutional nationalism defines the
national community as those committed to the principles of the Constitution."
Constitutional nationalism is recognizable as a variety of civic nationalism, in that it
defines what it means to be a member of the national community by reference to a
common set of civic ideals, in contrast to ethnonationalism, religious nationalism, and
racial nationalism, which define the national community by other criteria. To be sure,
the conviction that the Constitution embodies what it means to be American is widely
shared.' 2 Constitutional nationalists, however, take this notion to an extreme.
Constitutional nationalism can be understood as the political analog of originalism: just
as originalists posit that constitutional meaning was fixed at the time of the
Constitution's adoption, constitutional nationalists assert that American national
identity and values were forever fixed then too. 3 To constitutional nationalists, those
who do not sufficiently adhere to the fixed set of national values are un-American, and

7. See KiM PHILLIPs-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT FROM
THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN xi-xii (2009) (tracing the history of conservative opposition to the New Deal from
the American Liberty League to the 1980s); Goldman, supranote 6, at 6 (describing the Liberty League as the
"ancestor of Taft and Goldwater Republicanism").
8. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the Liberty League's ideology.
9. See, e.g., MICHAEL BILLIG, BANAL NATIONALISM 37 (1995) (defining "nationalism" as "the ideology
by which the world of nations has come to seem the natural world"); ELIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM 1 (4th ed.
1993) (describing the nationalist doctrine to hold that the only "legitimate type of government is national selfgovernment"); ANTHONY D. SMITH, THEORIES OF NATIONALISM 20-21 (2d ed. 1983) (illustrating some of the
core fundamentals of nationalism as identity with a nation and overriding loyalty to a nation).
10. Amy L. Chua, The Paradox ofFree Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 287, 315 (2000).
11. See Melvin 1. Urofsky, Book Review, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 429,431 (2002) (explaining Justice
John Marshall Harlan's view of constitutional nationalism as "the notion that a principle aim ofthe Framers
had been to weld the nation together, and that therefore the constitutional law had to be the same for all people
at all times").
12. President Obama repeated this familiar dogma in his second inaugural address, declaring: "We recall
that what binds this nation together is not the colors of our skin or the tenets of our faith or the origins of our
names. What makes us exceptional-what makes us American-is our allegiance to an idea," an idea
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Barack Obama, Inaugural Address by
President Barack Obama, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/2 1/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama.
13. See Urofsky, supra note 11, at 431 (explaining Justice John Marshall Harlan's view of constitutional
nationalism as "the notion that a principle aim of the Framers had been to weld the nation together, and that
therefore the constitutional law had to be the same for all people at all times").

TEMPLE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 86

4

the policies they support are unconstitutional.'
This Article launches a project to identify constitutional nationalism as a recurring
phenomenon in American public life. It does so by telling the nearly lost story of the
American Liberty League and its campaign to defeat the New Deal. Although the
American Liberty League has become little more than a footnote in most accounts of
the New Deal, the fight between the Liberty League and President Franklin D.
Roosevelt should be recognized as a central episode of popular constitutionalism, in
which the American people were asked to choose between competing constitutional
philosophies, both of which were asserted to embody true American values.
Examination of the public contest between the American Liberty League and the
Roosevelt reelection campaign helps illuminate the American people's role in the
revolution in constitutional philosophy associated with the New Deal, a subject that has
divided scholars for more than a generation.
Section I tells the story of the Liberty League's campaign to save America from
the New Deal. Section II tells how the Roosevelt campaign made the strategic choice to
make the American Liberty League, and not the Supreme Court or the Republicans, the
central focus of the 1936 reelection campaign. 15 The League made the perfect villain in
the constitutional drama of 1936. It was the unabashed voice of corporate America at 16a
time when big business was widely blamed for causing the Great Depression.
Roosevelt argued that the Liberty League and its leaders were not merely wrong about
the Constitution but were7 villains whose constitutional philosophy was a ruse to protect
their power and wealth.'
The Liberty League has received little attention in the massive scholarship that
has sought to explain the constitutional revolution associated with the New Deal, in
which the Supreme Court adopted a much more expansive view of government powers.
As Section III explains, the public dispute between the Liberty League and Roosevelt
helps to clarify how the New Deal constitutional philosophy won public acceptance. In
what has become the dominant narrative, put forward most prominently by Bruce
Ackerman, President Roosevelt responded to the Supreme Court's decisions striking
down New Deal laws by campaigning against the Supreme Court, and Roosevelt's
1936 landslide reelection shows that the American people endorsed the New Deal's
broad conceptions of federal power and rejected the Supreme Court's narrow
construction.' 8 Other scholars reject this narrative, arguing that the 1936 election
results cannot be understood to express a public endorsement of the New Deal
constitutional philosophy because Roosevelt did not actually make the Court's

14. See Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of PopularOriginalism,53 ARIZ. L.
REv. 827, 846-48 (2011) (discussing the constitutional nationalism of the Tea Party movement).
15. See JAMES A. FARLEY, BEHIND THE BALLOTS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF A POLITICIAN 294

(Greenwood Press 1972) (1938) ("[T]he ...
concentrate fire on the Liberty League.").

first 'battle-order' was to ignore the Republican Party and to

16. Id. at 295.
17. See WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 210 (describing the Democratic Party's tactics of painting the Liberty
League members as "disgruntled politicians" and "apostles of greed").
18. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 280, 311 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS].
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constitutional rulings a campaign issue. 19 The fight between the American Liberty
League and President Roosevelt shows that Ackerman's critics are correct that
Roosevelt did not actually campaign against the Court, yet Ackerman nonetheless is
right that the election focused centrally on the Constitution. Unlike Ackerman's
account, the American people were not asked to choose between the President and the
Supreme Court. Nor were they asked to resolve the meaning of the Constitution's text.
Instead, the competing public campaigns of Roosevelt and the American Liberty
League fundamentally asked the American people to decide who they were, and this
question of national identity was expressed in constitutional terms.
I.

THE AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE'S CAMPAIGN TO SAVE AMERICA

It is hardly surprising that in the mid-1930s a group of prominent businessmen
tried to organize a movement to oppose substantial new business regulations imposed
under New Deal laws.20 It is also not surprising that, in the midst of the Great
Depression, the movement failed miserably to convince the American people to give
millionaires unrestricted freedom to run their businesses and to reject newly won
protections for laborers, the elderly, and the unemployed. 21 What is remarkable,
however, is that the movement employed a distinctly constitutional and nationalist
rhetoric, which depicted the New Deal not just as bad policy but as contrary to core
American ideals as expressed in the Constitution.22 The Liberty League utterly failed to
topple the New Deal-in fact, as Section II suggests, it may have helped generate a
consensus in favor of the New Deal. 23 Yet the League crystallized the rhetoric and
philosophy of constitutional nationalism that has been at the core of a long line of
political movements challenging the modem American state ever since its defeat.
A.

"Defending the Faith of the Fathers": The Creation of the American Liberty
League

In August 1934, the American Liberty League was established by many of the
nation's most prominent business owners, who had come to believe that the New Deal
was destroying the foundations of American life. 24 This group included Pierre, Irrnre,
and Lammot du Pont, leaders of one of the nation's most powerful corporate families;
Alfred P. Sloan, president of General Motors (GM); Edward F. Hutton, chairman of

19. See William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election of 1936
and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L.J. 2077, 2077-79 (1999) (summarizing the "barrage of objections"

raised by Ackerman's critics).
20. See Rudolph, supra note 4, at 21-22 (listing the prominent business owners that were involved with
the American Liberty League).
21. See id. at 26 (describing how the American Liberty League ultimately failed due to the lack of
response from the American public).
22. See id. at 22, 30-31 (discussing how the League centered its ideology on the Constitution and the
American values that they believed stemmed from it).
23. See infra Section II for a discussion of the Roosevelt campaign's use of the League as a foil to
present the New Deal constitutional philosophy-a tactic that ultimately led to Roosevelt's landslide victory in
the 1936 election.
24. Rudolph, supra note 4, at 21-22
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General Foods; and J. Howard Pew, president of Sun Oil.25 It included the 1924 and
1928 Democratic presidential candidates, as well as two former chairmen of the
Democratic Party. 26 These men saw the proliferation of New Deal regulatory programs
as an assault on the core American values of limited government, individualism,
liberty, and hard work. 27 They believed that Americans would rise up against the New
Deal if only they realized that it was a radical, socialist, un-American form of tyranny,
and they hoped the American Liberty League would become the vehicle to awaken
28
America.
Recent experience gave these men good reason to believe that the American
people could be roused to rise up against federal tyranny. The founders of the Liberty
League had led the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment (AAPA), which
had played a leading role in the fight to repeal Prohibition. 29 The AAPA employed a
distinctly constitutional rhetoric, declaring that its mission was much grander than
merely making booze legal: it sought nothing less than "to preserve the spirit of the
Constitution of the United States." 3° To the leaders of the AAPA, Prohibition
represented an unprecedented expansion of federal power that deprived the people of
their liberties, most especially the liberty of businessmen and consumers to choose
what to buy and sell.31 Prohibition, the AAPA declared, represented a repudiation of
the principles laid out by the Founding Fathers. 32 The AAPA disbanded soon after the

25. Id.at 21.
26. JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 109-10 (2010);
Rudolph, supra note 4, at 22.
27. See, e.g., J. Howard Pew, Which Road to Take? (July 12, 1935), in Am. LIBERTY LEAGUE
DOCUMENT No. 53, at 3 ("Our country plainly faces a decision whether it will adopt a Planned Economy or
will continue on the course of individualism, equal opportunity, liberty of initiative, and constitutional
democracy."); Walter E. Spahr, The People's Money (July 10, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT
NO. 51, at 7 ("[T]his nation was established for the specific purpose, above all others, of enabling our people,
in thestimulating atmosphere of such freedom, to climb by their individual and ingenious efforts to any
heights towhich human beings might reasonably aspire.").
28. See, e.g., Demarest Lloyd, Fabian Socialism in the New Deal (July 9, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY
LEAGUE DOCUMENT NO. 50, at 16 (expressing hope that the American people will "awaken now to find the
Roosevelt administration has virtually tricked them, and substituted the Socialist Party platform instead");
Raskob to Expand Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1936, at 2 (quoting letter written by John J. Raskob in
which he declared that the League is "doing everything possible to root out the vicious radical element that
threatens the destruction of our government").
29. See WOLFSKILL, supranote 4, at 37-55 (describing the AAPA's efforts to repeal prohibition).
30. Id.at 50.
31. See Prohibitionand the Bill of Rights: How the ConstitutionalGuaranteesDisappearUnder the Dry
Regime, MINUTE MAN, Mar. 22, 1923, available at http://libraries.uky.edu/libpage.php?lwebid=474&llibid=
13&ltab id=898 (depicting how prohibition takes away the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights).
32. Jouett Shouse, the president of the AAPA, explained that the organization was founded "primarily
and wholly for a constitutional principle," to take a "police statute" from the federal power. WOLFSKILL, supra
note 4, at 46. In addition to their constitutional concerns, leaders of the AAPA may also have been motivated
by their personal interests, in that they believed that corporate and personal income taxes could be eliminated
if Prohibition were repealed and beer and liquor were taxed instead. See, e.g., ASS'N AGAINST THE
PROHIBITION AMENDMENT, COST OF PROHIBITION AND YOUR INCOME TAX 11 (1929) (comparing regulatory
costs and lost tax revenue associated with Prohibition with personal income tax paid to the federal
government); DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 50 (2d ed. 2000) ("[Under prohibition] the
right of local self-government is tom from the individual states, whose people are made subject, even in the
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adoption of repeal, but it declared that its leaders would continue to meet and might
form a new group that "would in the event of danger to the Federal Constitution, stand
33
ready to defend the faith of the fathers."
It did not take long for the former leaders of the AAPA to decide that the New
34
Deal posed an even greater threat to the "faith of the fathers" than had Prohibition.
Like Prohibition, the New Deal deprived business owners of the liberty to operate as
they chose, centralized power in Washington, and interfered with states' rights.35 But
while Prohibition deprived business owners of the liberty to sell one kind of product,
the New Deal imposed federal commands on almost every aspect of business life. 36 Not
only did New Deal regulations take away businessmen's rights to liberty and property,
37
New Deal relief programs undermined employees' incentives to work hard.
In March 1934, R.R.M. Carpenter, a retired DuPont vice president, expressed the
38
gist of these concerns in a letter to John Raskob, the former chairman of GM.
Carpenter believed that the New Deal sapped the American work ethic: "Five negroes
on my place in South Carolina refused work this Spring ...saying they had easy jobs
with the government .... A cook on my houseboat at Fort Myers quit because the
government was paying him a dollar an hour as a painter." 39 Carpenter wondered
whether anything could be done to save America. 40 Raskob replied that he agreed that
the New Deal was undermining the entrepreneurial spirit.41 Raskob felt that a new
organization was needed to "protect society from the suffering which it is bound to
endure if we allow communistic elements to lead the people to believe that all business
men are crooks." 42 Raskob suggested that perhaps the du Ponts could take the lead
because "there is no group, including the Rockefellers, the Morgans, the Mellons, or
any one else that begins to control and be responsible for as much industrially, as is the

small routine affairs of their daily lives, to those living in far distant localities and under other conditions.")
(quoting AAPA President William H. Stayton)); WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 48 (quoting AAPA position that
a tax on beer "would enable the federal government to get rid of the burdensome corporation taxes and income
taxes and to take the snoopers and spies out of offices and homes").
33. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 54.
34. Id. at 55.
35. See JouettShouse, The Constitution Still Stands (Feb. 12, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE
DOCUMENT No. 16, at 13-14 (discussing the "[I]esson[s] of Prohibition" for the New Deal and declaring that
"[tihere could be no more certain way to destroy the perpetuity of our institutions than to establish now a
strongly centralized Federal Government which in the writing of our Constitution was forbidden").
36. See, e.g., Fitzgerald Hall, The Imperilment of Democracy, (July 18, 1935), in AMERICAN LIBERTY
LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 58, at 3 (asserting that the New Deal "is attempting to consolidate and concentrate in
Washington power over the most intimate affairs in the life of every individual").
37. See, e.g., Frederick H. Stinchfield, The American Constitution-Whose Heritage? The Self-Reliant
or Those Who Would Be Wards of the Government? (Jan. 18, 1936), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No.
90, at 6 ("1 inquire whether the Constitution was established for the increase of self-reliance, or to develop the

spirit of dependency?").
38. See The Carpenter and Raskob Letters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1934, at 2 (expressing Carpenter's
concern that many businessmen could not find enough laborers due to the abundance of easy government
jobs).

39. Id.
40. See id("Who can possibly give employment to labor if wealthy men and capital are eliminated[?l").

41. Id.
42. Id.
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du Pont company."43 As Raskob put it, the du Ponts were "in a position to talk directly
with a group that controls a larger share of industry ... than any other group in the
44
United States."
GM and DuPont executives soon met at the Empire State Building office of Al
Smith, former New York governor and 1928 Democratic presidential candidate, to
discuss the formation of a new group modeled on the AAPA and devoted to
challenging the constitutional validity of the New Deal. 4 Alfred Sloan of GM
suggested calling the new group the "Association Asserting the Rights of Property. 46
Jouett Shouse, former Democratic Party chairman, suggested the "National Property
League," and E.F. Hutton suggested the "American Federation of Business." 47 John W.
Davis garnered a consensus with the more neutral sounding "American Liberty
League." 48 Raskob, Sloan, Irdnre du Pont, and others immediately donated $40,000 to
launch the new organization. 49 Shouse, who less than a year earlier had stepped down
50
as president of the AAPA, was appointed to serve as the League's president.
On August 22, 1934, Shouse held a press conference to announce the
establishment of the American Liberty League.5 ' Shouse described the League as
nonpartisan and declared that, as its acronym "ALL" suggested, the League spoke for
all of the American people, whose liberties were under attack by the New Deal.5 2 The
League declared that its central mission was the preservation of the nation's
constitutional values:
[The American Liberty League] is a non-partisan organization formed.., to
defend and uphold the Constitution ...[to] teach the necessity of respect for
the rights of persons and property as fundamental to every successful form of
government ...to encourage and protect individual and group initiative and
enterprise, to foster the right to work, earn, save and acquire property, and to
53
preserve the ownership and lawful use of property when acquired.
John Raskob invited "all liberty-loving citizens to join the American Liberty League,..
which is doing everything possible to root out the vicious radical element that

43. Id.

44. Id.
45. See ROBERT F. BURK, THE CORPORATE STATE AND THE BROKER STATE: THE DU PONTS AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICS, 1925-1940, at 134-38 (1990) (describing the American Liberty League's
founding members' deliberations concerning the objectives and title of the Liberty League).
46. Id.at 138.
47. Id.
48. Id.at 141-42.
49. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 26.
50. BURK, supra note 45, at 138.
51. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 20-21; League Is Formed to Scan New Deal, 'ProtectRights,' N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1934, at 1.

52. See SHESOL, supra note 26, at 110-11 (stating that the Liberty League was hoping to "be known by
the egalitarian acronym 'ALL"'); Shouse Elected by Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1934, at 5
(discussing Shouse's statement that the Liberty League was neutral with regard to the New Deal and had no
political party affiliation).

53. Jouett Shouse, President, Am. Liberty League, Statement Made at Time of the Announcement of the
Formation of the American Liberty League (Aug. 23, 1934).
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threatens the destruction of our government. ' 54 Leaders of the Liberty League were
optimistic that they would quickly gain widespread support.5 5 At the first news
conference, Shouse predicted that within a year the League would have two to three
million members. 56 The next week Shouse declared that the "response from all parts of
the country to formation of the league has been astounding," with thousands of pledges
57
already arriving.
Money from the du Ponts and like-minded businessmen flowed in. In its first year,
the Liberty League raised half a million dollars, giving it unprecedented resources to
carry out this campaign. 58 By January 1936, the League had resources that exceeded
those of the Republican Party.59 It had more cash than the Republicans and operated
from a centralized headquarters in Washington, which occupied thirty-one rooms and
had more than fifty full-time staff members-almost triple the size of the Republican
Party offices and staff. 60 That year, Shouse was the nation's highest paid political
61
operative.
It was not merely their success in defeating Prohibition and the vast resources at
their disposal that made leaders of the American Liberty League optimistic that they
could succeed in toppling the New Deal. When the League was formed, it was widely
believed that Roosevelt's prospects for reelection in 1936 were dim.62 In 1934, there
appeared to be definite signs that the American people were turning against
Roosevelt. 63 Roosevelt's popularity had been falling since February 1934, reaching a
64
low of fifty percent in September 1935, according to the public surveys of the day.
Unemployment and poverty rates remained stubbornly high-notwithstanding the
proliferation of expensive federal programs sold to the public as the solution to the
Depression. 65 The Republicans, meanwhile, had largely capitulated to Roosevelt and

54. Raskob to ExpandLiberty League, supra note 28, at 2.

55. See WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 29, 56 (discussing how members of the American Liberty League
and the New York Times predicted that many Wall Street leaders, bankers, brokers, employees, and workers
would join).
56. League Is Formed to Scan New Deal, 'ProtectRights,' supra note 51, at 4.
57. Pledges PourIn at Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1934, at 2.
58. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 62-63 (explaining that the American Liberty League was "really
healthy" given the nearly 1.2 million dollars it raised during its six-year history).
59. See Liberty League Income Equals Major Parties',WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1936, at 9 (reporting that in
1935 the American Liberty League raised $483,275, while the Republican Party raised $407,454).
60. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 57.
61. See Liberty League Pays Shouse Top Salary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1936, at 7 (reporting that the
American Liberty League paid Shouse $36,000 per year with $18,000 for expenses-the highest of any
individual working for a political organization).
62. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 7 (1960)
(discussing the decline in the President's popularity); SHESOL, supra note 26, at 158 (stating that since
February 1934, Roosevelt's approval rating dropped about one percent per month).
63. SHESOL, supra note 26, at 158.
64. Id. at 158.
65. See WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 10-11 (stating that "[d]espite definite and encouraging signs of
recovery the country was still in trouble" and that critics of the President were critical of the expensive
agricultural relief and labor programs).
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offered no comprehensive program to compete with the New Deal. 66
With enormous resources to make it the leading opposition to Roosevelt,
American Liberty League leaders believed that the group was bound to attract
widespread attention and public support. 67 They were half right. The League generated
enormous media attention, but it always remained the pet project of a small group of
corporate leaders. 68 The League never caught on with the American people. 69 At its
peak, the League claimed 150,000 members, and even that claim itself was highly
70
exaggerated.
B.

The ConstitutionalRhetoric and Philosophyof the American Liberty League

Leaders of the American Liberty League believed that the 1936 election would
71
determine whether the Constitution and the American way of life would survive.
Asserting that President Roosevelt had betrayed his oath to defend the Constitution, the
League declared that the election would resolve whether "we are to continue to enjoy a
government of laws and not of men, or shall have foisted upon us an Americanized
copy of Old World dictatorship." 72 To save America, the American Liberty League
launched a massive campaign to educate the American public on the evils of the New
73
Deal and thereby defeat Roosevelt.
The Liberty League's chief weapons were pamphlets, newsletters, speeches, and
radio addresses. In 1935 and 1936, the League published 135 pamphlets and a monthly
newsletter, which were distributed across the country to millions of homes and
thousands of libraries. 74 The League also sponsored dozens of speeches broadcast on
the national radio networks, many of which it later reprinted in pamphlet form.75 Some
66. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL
484 (1959) (stating that in 1934 conservatives increasingly felt the need for an organization through which
they could carryon their fight for American principles because the Republican party was identified with
"misrule and defeat"); SHESOL, supra note 26, at 161 (asserting that the Republicans "had nothing to offer by
way of an alternative to the New Deal" and that "[o]n the right, the real vitality belonged to the American
Liberty League").
67. See, e.g., Rudolph, supra note 4, at 21 ("At a time when the Republican party was bankrupt of
leadership and purpose, the American Liberty League became the spokesman for a business civilization, and a
defender of that civilization from the attacks of the administration in Washington ...").
68. See WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 56 (stating that the League made headlines almost daily for more
than two years); id.at 62-63 (explaining that the American Liberty League lacked a "broad base of popular
support" but received much of its support from less than two dozen bankers, industrialists, and businessmen).
69. See id.at 62 (stating that eleven months after the American Liberty League's formation it had only
36,055 members and at its strength in the months leading up to the 1936 election it had 124,856 members).
70. See id (stating that the League's membership peaked at 124,856); Arthur Krock, Liberty League Is
DistinctlyPro-Landon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1936, at 18 (stating that the League claimed 150,000 members).
71. See, e.g., Assert PresidentBetrayed Oath, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1936, at L37 (declaring that the issue
in 1936 was "not whether the Constitution shall be amended but whether it shall be destroyed").
72. Id.
73. See WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 65 (explaining that the campaign aimed to improve the public's
opinion of the League to support its "great moral issue").
74. Id. at 65-66. The pamphlets published by the American Liberty League can be found at the Special
Collections
at
the
University
of
Kentucky
Libraries
and
are
available
at
http://kdl.kyvl.org/cataloglxt7wwp9t2q46/guide.
75. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 65.
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of the League's pamphlets addressed specific New Deal legislation, with titles such as
The AAA Amendments: An Analysis of ProposalsIllustratinga Trend Toward a Fascist
Control Not Only of Agriculture but Also of a Major Sector of Manufacturing and
DistributingIndustries and The Bituminous Coal Bill: An Analysis of a ProposedStep
Toward Socialization of Industry.76 Most of the pamphlets took on the New Deal as a
whole, bearing provocative titles like Is the Constitutionfor Sale?, Americanism at the
77
Crossroads,and What Is the ConstitutionBetween Friends?
The Liberty League reached the American public not only by distributing millions
of pamphlets and sponsoring radio broadcasts but also through extensive news
coverage of its activities. As Jeff Shesol has written, perhaps with some exaggeration,
"[e]very pamphlet-whether another denunciation of the New Deal or a comparison of
FDR to Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and George III (all in a single pamphlet)-was
news." 78 While it is not literally true that every pamphlet attracted national attention,
the American Liberty League quickly became a media sensation. In its two main years
of operation-from Shouse's announcement of the creation of the League in August
1934 to November 3, 1936, the day of the 1936 election-the New York Times ran over
400 stories that mentioned the League, the Washington Post published over 600
articles, and the Chicago Tribune published over 350. 79 By the start of the 1936
election campaign, the American Liberty League had become an unavoidable part of
the political landscape. Politicians and commentators of all kinds responded to it.
Sinclair Lewis attacked it. 80 John Dewey sought to explain it.81 The Assistant Attorney
General debated its leaders. 82 By all accounts, President Roosevelt himself took the
76. THE AAA AMENDMENTS, AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT NO. 30 (Apr. 1935); THE BITUMINOUS
COAL BILL, AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 32 (Apr. 1935).
77. William H. Stayton, Is the Constitution for Sale? (May 30, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE
DOCUMENT No. 40; Raoul E. Desvemine, Americanism at the Crossroads (Jan. 15, 1936), in AM. LIBERTY
LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 88; James M. Beck, "What is the Constitution Between Friends?" (Mar. 27, 1935), in
AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 22.
78. SHESOL, supra note 26, at 161-62. Examples of news coverage generated by Liberty League
pamphlets can be seen in various national newspapers. Assails New Deal Record, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1936,
at L2 (discussing Liberty League pamphlet on National Recovery Act); Guffey Predicts Roosevelt Sweep, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1936, at L6 (reporting on Liberty League pamphlet on the "appalling" growth of the federal
bureaucracy); New AAA Law Hit by Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1936, at L8 (summarizing Liberty
League pamphlet attacking the Agricultural Adjustment Act); New Taxes Assailed as DictatorshipStep, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1936, at L5 (summarizing Liberty League pamphlet on 1935 and 1936 revenue acts); Plans to
Share Wealth Called Quack Schemes, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1936, at 2 (discussing Liberty League statement
attacking a "Utopian scheme for []redistribution"); 'Socialization' Held Goal of Power Drive, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1936, at L3 (summarizing American Liberty League pamphlet arguing that the Tennessee Valley
Authority is unconstitutional).
79. Search of ProQuest Historical Newspapers database.
80. See S.J. Woolf, It Won't Happen Here, Lewis Believes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1936, at SM3 (calling
organizations like the American Liberty League "economic royalists" with closed minds).
81. See John Dewey, A Liberal Speaks Out for Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1936, at SM3
(explaining that the spokesmen of the American Liberty League believe that any governmental action that
interferes with individualism "is an attack upon liberty itself'). Historian Charles Beard also chided the League
for misunderstanding constitutional history. Dr. BeardAsks Broader View of Constitution, WASH. POST, Jan.
14, 1936, at 5.
82. See Social Weal Held Guiding Public Aim, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1936, at L39 (reporting that the
Assistant Attorney General participated in a round-table conference debating means of achieving economic
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American Liberty League seriously. 83
Notwithstanding the widespread attention the League received, scholars generally
have not taken the Liberty League's ideology seriously, frequently characterizing the
League's constitutional claims as a ruse to obscure the League's true purpose of
protecting its founders' wealth and power. 84 Writing in 1937, Max Lemer said that
Liberty Leaguers made a "fetish" of the Constitution, invoking the "sanctity of the
Constitution . . . . in a coldly instrumental way for their own purposes. ' 85 In 1950,
historian Frederick Rudolph similarly characterized the League's patriotic and
constitutional rhetoric as "[t]he cloak in which the Liberty League dressed itself in
order to promote its position and its program. ' 86 Historian Arthur Schlesinger agreed,
declaring that "[a]t no point on record did the American Liberty League construe
'liberty' as meaning anything else but the folding stuff," that is, money. 87 More
recently, Jeff Shesol declared that the League used constitutional rhetoric to hide its
founders' true goals because "[t]he American people, it could safely be assumed, were
unlikely to respond to a call to let the rich get richer. ' 88 In charging that the Liberty
League used constitutional rhetoric to obscure the movement's true agenda, these
scholars simply restate President Roosevelt's own critique that the League sought to
"hide behind the flag and the Constitution."89
Unquestionably, the League considered strategic goals in placing its focus on the
Constitution. William H. Stayton, founder of the AAPA and one of the League's
founders, declared that opposition to the New Deal could attract public support only if
it were presented as "a moral or an emotional issue," and no issue "could command
more support or evoke more enthusiasm among our people than the simple issue of the
'Constitution.' 90 Stayton urged the League to make the Constitution central because,
as he put it, "there is a mighty-though vague-affection for it. The people, I believe,
need merely to be led and instructed, and this affection will become almost worship
and can be converted into an irresistible movement." 91
Yet it is a mistake to dismiss the Liberty League's constitutional message as
empty rhetoric even if the League used constitutional rhetoric to put a patriotic shine on
its probusiness message. The League's constitutional message must be examined to
understand how constitutional issues were presented to the public in 1936. Moreover,
the League may have been the loudest and most prominent, but it was part of a broader
movement of corporate and elite forces that challenged the New Deal as anathema to

security for citizens with the chairman of the lawyers' committee of the American Liberty League).
83. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 56.

84. Only historian George Wolfskill gave the Liberty League's ideology any serious consideration,
declaring that the League's pamphlets "represented perhaps the most concise and thorough summary of
conservative political thought written in the United States since The Federalist papers." Id. at 65.
85. Max Lemer, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1305 (1937).

86. Rudolph, supra note 4, at 22. This rhetoric, Rudolph explained, "was made of respectable
generalities, partial self-delusion, intense sincerity, and frequently embarrassing hypocrisy." Id.
87. SCHLESINGER, supra note 66, at 488.
88. SHESOL, supra note 26, at 108.
89. Text of Roosevelt Address, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1936, at 25.

90. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at Ill (quoting William H. Stayton).
91. Id. (quoting William H. Stayton).
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foundational American principles. 92 In 1934, Herbert Hoover wrote that the New Deal
was "the most stupendous invasion of the whole spirit of Liberty that the nation has
witnessed since the days of Colonial America." 93 Like the Liberty League, Hoover
believed that the New Deal had created a totalitarian state with "daily dictation by
Government in every town and village every day in the week, of how men are to
conduct their daily lives." 94 Hoover charged that the New Deal was sapping America of
the rugged individualism that he believed defined its national character. 95 Hoover and
other conservatives believed that the New Deal threatened the basis of national identity
and feared that unless the New Deal were reversed, "America will cease to be
96
American."
Regardless of whether it was empty rhetoric adopted solely as a matter of
marketing, Liberty League pamphlets and speeches reveal a comprehensively
articulated philosophy of constitutional nationalism, in which adherence to a set of
libertarian ideals simultaneously defines both what the Constitution requires and what
it means to be American. 97 As discussed infra in Parts I.B.1-3, the Constitution plays a
prominent role in the League's philosophy but less as a legal text to read and interpret
than as the embodiment and symbol of American values. 98 The League's philosophy
emphasized three related points. First, the League sought to explain and defend what it
called Americanism-the fundamental values and way of life of the United States.
Second, the League perceived the New Deal to be a radical, alien force based on
collectivism rather than individualism, and which therefore ran directly contrary to the

92. Several other groups-the Southern Committee to Uphold the Constitution, the Sentinels of the
Republic, the Farmers' Independence Council of America-made broadly similar claims. See J. RICHARD
PIPER, IDEOLOGIES AND INSTITUTIONS: AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL GOVERNANCE PRESCRIPTIONS
SINCE 1933 70 (1997) (stating that the American Liberty League "occupied the central role in the conservative
propaganda campaign" in the period leading up to the 1936 election); WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 231, 239,
241-42 (discussing the wide variety of anti-New Deal organizations that the American Liberty League
supported).
93. HERBERT HOOVER, THE CHALLENGE TO LIBERTY 85 (1934); see also Edward S. Corwin, Book
Review, 44 YALE L.J. 546, 547 (1935) (stating that Hoover's book "was ostensibly written to show that
the New Deal has imperiled American liberty").
94. HOOVER, supra note 93, at 85.
95. See id at I (declaring that the New Deal amounted to an attack on "the whole philosophy of
individual liberty"); SCHLESINGER, supra note 66, at 475-476 (stating that Hoover felt the New Deal faded a
local community's independence, and with it the "sense of community responsibility," turning instead "to
greed for Federal money"). Moreover, during the 1934 midterm election campaign, the Republican Party
likewise made the claim that the New Deal amounted to an attack on American individualism, declaring that
"[iun place of individual initiative [Roosevelt and his advisors] seek to substitute government control of all
agricultural production, of all business activity." Id. at 481.
96. HOOVER, supra note 93, at 5; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 66, at 475 ("[M]any conservatives
earnestly believed that the New Deal was destroying the historic pattern of American life-a pattern of local
initiative and individual responsibility."). Hoover himself declined the invitation to join the Liberty League,
declaring that he had "no more confidence in the Wall Street model of human liberty, which this group so well
represents, than I have in the Pennsylvania Avenue model upon which the country now rides." HERBERT
HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER-THE GREAT DEPRESSION 1929-1941, at 454-55 (1952).
97. See Rudolph, supra note 4, at 20 ("The Liberty League represented a vigorous and well-stated
defense of nineteenth century individualism and liberalism, a more explicit and determined elaboration of that
position than will be found elsewhere in American history.").
98. See infra Parts I.B.1-3 for a discussion of the League's constitutional philosophy.
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principles of Americanism. Third, the League believed that the New Deal posed an
existential threat to the nation: acceptance of the New Deal meant the end of the
American way of life. The League's pamphlets and speeches endlessly repeated these
three points.
1.

In Defense of Americanism

The American Liberty League professed itself devoted to protecting
Americanism, a broad term encompassing what the League identified as the nation's
fundamental values. 99 Liberty League pamphlets claimed that the nation prospered as
long as it stayed faithful to the fundamental values of Americanism. 10 0 To the Liberty
League, Americanism most centrally entailed a commitment to individual liberty, and
the most important liberty was the ability to make choices in economic matters, what
one League pamphlet called the people's "fundamental right of using their own private
property and of running their individual farms and businesses in the manner which
seems to them best."'' 1 Government power must be limited to avoid interfering with
the economic liberties that are at the heart of an individual's ability to choose his own
path.' 0 2 The League thus took a strict libertarian position, under which all government
03
regulations were considered forms of tyranny.

99. Desvemine, supra note 77, at 4-5, 18-19 (discussing President Roosevelt's attempts to increase the
federal government's power and claiming that it goes against what the Framers envisioned and is incompatible
with the concept of "Americanism"); William H. Ellis, The Spirit of Americanism (Apr. 26, 1935), in AM.
LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 59, at 4-5 (discussing how the expansion of federal government goes
against the concept of limited enumerated powers).
100. See Jouett Shouse, Democracy or Bureaucracy (Feb. 4, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT
No. 14, at 19 (claiming that the Constitution has enabled the United States to help spread the wealth among all
of its people, made the country great, allowed for assimilation of millions of foreigners, and has given every
citizen his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness); see also Stayton, supra note 77, at 3 (claiming
that obeying the Constitution in the past caused great prosperity and neglecting it has led to distress and
unemployment).
101. Hall, supra note 36, at 4; see also Shouse, supra note 100, at 20 ("[H]uman rights and property
rights are inseparable and [] the right to own property is among the most important of human rights."). As
another pamphlet declared, "this nation was established for the specific purpose, above all others, of enabling
our people, in the stimulating atmosphere of such freedom, to climb by their individual and ingenious efforts to
any heights to which human beings might reasonably aspire." Spahr, supra note 27, at 7. Americanism
likewise means "[r]espect for the sacredness of an individual's personality and of his right to develop it to the
limit of his capacity." Id.
102. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 5, at 10 ("Economic freedom is the foundation for all other
liberties."); Desvemine, supra note 77, at 7 (stating that prevention of concentration of power in one political
branch through checks and balances is crucial to the concept of "Americanism").
103. As John Davis, the 1924 Democratic presidential candidate, declared, "Regulation is a term behind
which every form of tyranny, great and small, can hide itself." John W. Davis, The Redistribution of Power
(Jan. 24, 1936), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 93, at 15; see also Albert C. Ritchie, The American
Form of Government-Let Us Preserve It (Jan. 18, 1936), in AM. LIBERTY DOCUMENT No. 92, at 6-7
(identifying restrictions on government power, federalism, and separation of powers as key elements of the
"American form of government").
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2.

The Conflict Between Americanism and the New Deal

The League's defense of Americanism was stridently nationalist, its leaders
repeatedly declaring that they were "bitterly and aggressively opposed" to any
"alienism."' 1 4 The Liberty League assessed the New Deal to be of alien nature because
it imposed substantial regulations on business and thereby limited individual
freedom.105 In the League's words, New Deal protections against low wages and relief
for the unemployed and elderly were based on a philosophy of collectivism that
conflicts with the principle that individual merit should determine a person's fate. 06 As
one League pamphlet declared, "the weak should not be artificially maintained in
wealth and power ....
Each individual must rise or sink to the level for which he is
fitted by the quality of his tissues and of his soul."'10 7 By offering protections for the
weak, Roosevelt had rejected individualism and thereby "repudiate[d] the Constitution
08
and declare[d] war on the whole system of American freedom.'
In standing up to the New Deal, the American Liberty League declared that it was

standing up for the Founding Fathers. Stayton roused Liberty Leaguers by reminding
them that "he who takes the 'Constitution' for his battle-cry, has as his allies the
Fathers of old."' 109 Roosevelt, the League repeatedly claimed, had abandoned the
Founding Fathers in favor of the philosophies of European communists, socialists, and
fascists. 110 Shouse charged that Roosevelt sought to replace a government built upon
104. R. E. Desvemine, Letter to the Editor, PositionDefined, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1936, at E9.
105. See, e.g., Ritchie, supra note 103, at 9 (claiming that the measures and policies under the New Deal
will destroy the American form of government); James W. Wadsworth, The Blessings of Stability (July 12,
1935), in AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 54, at 10 (declaring that the New Deal represents "an
appalling change in the American conception of liberty. It deprives the individual of his freedom of choice as
to the means by which he shall pursue happiness, and thus runs directly contrary to the ideal expressed in the
Declaration of Independence."); Shouse Upholds Revolt in Party, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1936, at L27 (quoting
Shouse as characterizing the New Deal as "wholly alien to the American concept of government").
106. See Stinchfield, supra note 37, at 5-6 (discussing how New Deal legislation like the Social Security
Bill and the Labor Relations statute take the country away from the principle of self-reliance and towards
paternalism).
107. Id. at 14 (quoting ALEXIS CARREL, MAN, THE UNKNOWN 298-99 (1935)).
108. G. W. Dyer, "Regimenting the Farmers" (May 5, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No.
33, at 5; see also Desvemine, supra note 5, at 19 (declaring that the New Deal is "alien and foreign to our
constitutional philosophy. It destroys our American system and substitutes the European system."); Lloyd,
supra note 28, at 7 (declaring that the New Deal had been revealed to have "a startling purpose, the scrapping
of the American political and industrial systems and the substitution of a thoroughly alien order"). Al Smith
thus charged that the New Deal was spending tax money "to train young men to go out and preach
communism, to preach the gospel of 'down with property, down with capital, down with government, down
with church, yes, down with God."' F. Raymond Daniell, Smith Links Reds with Roosevelt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 1936, at 42.
109. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 112.
110. See, e.g., THE AAA AND OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT, AM. LIBERTY DOCUMENT. No. 80, at 2 (Dec.
1935) (asserting that the New Deal represents "a vicious combination of Fascism, Socialism and Communism"
that conflicts with the American form of government). Al Smith-the former Governor of New York and 1928
Democratic presidential candidate-broke with Roosevelt and supported the Liberty League, asserting that
Roosevelt had chosen Karl Marx over Thomas Jefferson. See Alfred E. Smith, The Facts in the Case (Jan. 25,
1936), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT NO. 97, at 14 (suggesting that Democrats support the ideology of

Marx and Lenin over that of Jefferson); Marvin V. Ausubel, The Rise and Fall of Martin Thomas Manton,
N.Y. ST. B.A J., March/April 2010, at 28, 33 n.19 (indicating that Smith was an unsuccessful presidential
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"the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" with "a totalitarian government, one which
recognizes no sphere of individual or business life as immune from governmental
authority and which submerges the welfare of the individual to that of the
government."" 1 I Indeed, the League said that Roosevelt and his brain trusters "sneered"

at the Founding Fathers.112
A key Liberty League charge was that Roosevelt and his advisers were secret
socialists who sought to foist their alien program on the nation without the American
people's consent. 113 Although Roosevelt had won the election in 1932, the League
maintained that the American people had never supported the New Deal."I4 They voted
for Roosevelt because he promised voters to protect capitalism, not destroy it. 115 It was
only after the election that Roosevelt revealed his agenda of instituting European-style
socialism upon an unsuspecting American public. 16 Once the American people
recognized what was happening-in the words of one Liberty League pamphlet, once
they "awaken[ed] ...to find the Roosevelt administration has virtually tricked them,
and substituted the Socialist Party platform" for the Democratic Party platform-the
people would surely vote Roosevelt out and restore Americanism." 7 Showing the
American people the truth about the New Deal was precisely what the Liberty League
sought to do.
Although the American Liberty League called on the American public to rise up
against the New Deal, it was far from a populist movement. Instead, it staunchly
supported elite control and called on the people to put their faith in judges, not the

candidate in 1928 and that he was the governor of New York for three terms). Smith said that Roosevelt
merely pretended to follow the founders of the Democratic Party: "It is all right with me if they want to
disguise themselves asNorman Thomas or Karl Marx,or Lenin, or any of the rest of that bunch, but what I
won't stand for is allowing them to march under the banner of Jefferson, Jackson or Cleveland." Smith, supra,
at 14.
111.Shouse Upholds Revolt in Party,supranote 105, at L27.
112. Hall, supra note 36, at 5.
113. One Liberty League pamphlet described Roosevelt as a Fabian Socialist who "studiously avoids
mention of Socialism [but] wants to do it by propaganda and political action in the name of something else of
gentle sound, such as 'Better Social Order,' 'Social Justice,' (pious phrase that) . . . and-by Jove, I almost
forgot-'New Deal'!" Lloyd, supra note 28, at 4; see also Desvemine, supra note 5, at 13 ("The worst
indictment which can be made against the present Administration is these indirect and subtle attempts to
change the fundamental principles of our constitutional system in such a manner as to conceal their true
purpose from the people and thereby deprive the people of their sovereign right to determine the substance of
their government.").
114. See, e.g., Jouett Shouse, "Breathing Spells" (Sept. 16, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT
No. 65, at 4 (noting that no New Deal elements had been suggested during Roosevelt's campaign and asserting
that if they had, Roosevelt would not have been elected president).
115. See, e.g., James M. Carson, The Constitution and the New Deal (Dec. 16, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY
LEAGUE DOCUMENT NO. 89, at 3 (discussing the President's "failure to carry out the pledges of the Democratic
platform" and the New Deal's "subtle and undercover attack upon the Constitution of the United States");
Lloyd, supra note 28, at 13 ("How, then, did such a man get elected to the Presidency? Answer: By the voters
relying upon his specific promises and those contained in the Platform upon which he ran.").
116. See, e.g., Shouse, supra note 114, at 4 (asserting that if the New Deal "had been put frankly before
the American people Mr. Roosevelt would not have been elected President").
117. Lloyd, supra note 28, at 16.
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118
President, to apply the principles of Americanism established in the Constitution.
The meaning of the Constitution, League supporters continually warned, was not
subject to the whims of popular opinion. 19 Notwithstanding the League's antipopulist
ideology, it saw an important role for the people, calling on them to stand up for the
Constitution against the machinations of the New Deal, which had perverted the true
meaning of the Constitution. 20 As one Liberty League pamphlet put it: "Every great
constitutional debate in the history of this country ... has, in the last analysis, had to be
taken to the people themselves, and that must be true in any country where the people
12 1
are the ultimate sovereigns."'

3.

The New Deal's Threat to National Existence

The Liberty League warned that the New Deal was not just misguided but it
threatened to "destroy the essential features of our government" and "substitute
Americanism with Totalitarianism."' 122 The Liberty League warned again and again that
the existence of the United States was threatened by the New Deal. 123 If the New Deal
continued, one Liberty League pamphlet warned, it would "mean the defeat of the
American theory of democracy."' 124 As League supporters saw it, the New Deal was
succeeding in undermining the American spirit. 125 "We used to be a virile, self-reliant

118. Raoul Desvernine, the Chairman of the Lawyers Committee, declared that "it would seem wisdom
and experience to continue to entrust them [the courts] with the working out of this problem." Desvernine,
supra note 5, at 11. The League frequently criticized Roosevelt for attempting to undermine the judiciary's
role as protector of the Constitution. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 115, at 14 ("You can trust your courts....
You can not let the Executive pass on the constitutionality of his own acts, nor can you let the Congress pass
on the constitutionality of theirs."); Charles 1. Dawson, The President Has Made the Issue (Jan. 25, 1936), in
AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 95, at 13 ("Usurpation and perversion of the Constitution by judicial
construction is the plan of the present Administration."); Shouse, supra note 114, at 9 (declaring that the
League "stands ready, with every resource at its command, to do all it can to defend the power of the Judicial
branch of our govemment").
119. As League supporters argued, Roosevelt sought to undermine the true meaning of the Constitution
by appointing justices who agreed with him. Judge Dawson asked,
Does any man or woman within the sound of my voice doubt that the President hopes, if re-elected,
he will have the opportunity within the next four years to place upon the Supreme Court enough
judges holding his own constitutional views to change the whole current of constitutional
construction in this country?
Dawson, supra note 118, at 13-14.
120. Former Solicitor General James Beck explained that the Liberty League was necessary because
"[t]hose who love the Constitution must join forces in its defense." Beck, supra note 77, at 11.
121. Carson, supra note 115, at 4.
122. Desvemine, supra note 77, at 13.
123. See, e.g., id at 12 (declaring that "[o]ur individuality, our independence is being merged into and
subordinated to a superstate"); Stinchfield, supra note 37, at 6 (cautioning that the result of the New Deal "will
be the destruction of self-reliance in every citizen of the United States").
124. Albert C. Ritchie, The American Bar-The Trustee of American Institutions (June 29, 1935), in
AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 48, at 4. In another League pamphlet, Nicholas Roosevelt-the
President's cousin-warned that the New Deal "means substituting an economic dictatorship for a political
democracy. I, for one, regard this as a threat to the very foundations of our civilization." Nicholas Roosevelt,
Two Amazing Years (July 8, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 49, at 14.
125. See, e.g., Ritchie, supra note 124, at 4 (cautioning that the New Deal puts the "spirit of individual
American freedom" in danger).
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people," one pamphlet explained, "[w]e were at one time willing to ascribe our
misfortunes to our own lack of wisdom and self-control, to tighten the belt, and to
repair our own shortcomings."' 126 No longer. The American people were unwilling to
take personal responsibility for their misfortunes and deal with the Depression by
tightening their belts because the New Deal had replaced American individualism with
a "spirit of dependency."' 127 Under the New Deal, the League believed, little was left of
liberty: "No business man was his own master" because New Deal programs "rigidly
enslaved its devotees."' 128 Indeed, enslaving the people to an all-powerful government
was the very point of the New Deal. 129 Roosevelt must be defeated, the Liberty League
0
warned, or all Americans would soon be enslaved.13
Convinced that the New Deal represented a profound breach of faith with
American values, the League believed that the election of 1936 would determine
whether the nation would survive. 131 The nation stood at a crossroads, the League
warned, in which it could choose to continue down "the old American 'horse and
buggy' road of democracy with the Constitution as its foundation" or follow Roosevelt
down a "foreign slave trail of arbitrary government built upon the will of man.' ' 132 As
one League pamphlet explained, the issue to be decided through the 1936 election was
33
not "whether the Constitution shall be amended, but whether it shall be destroyed."'
II.

THE ROOSEVELT CAMPAIGN'S RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE

The story, frequently repeated, has become familiar. After the Supreme Court
struck down key pieces of the New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt ran "against the Court"
34
and won a resounding public mandate for his expansive philosophy of federal power.1

126. Stinchfield, supra note 37, at 6-7.
127. Id. at 6. Moreover, by providing federal relief, the New Deal coddled the weak and lazy at the
expense of the strong and hardworking, who had lawfully earned the money that the government then took
from them and redistributed. See id. at 14 ("Modern nations will save themselves by developing the strong.
Not by protecting the weak.").
128. Id.at 4-5. For instance, the Agricultural Adjustment Act-held unconstitutional in United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936)-"told every man what, where, and how much to sow, and when and how much to
reap." Id.at 5. Jouett Shouse agreed that the AAA "embodie[d] the very basis" of the "New Deal philosophy":
"Under the guise of benefits to the farmers the effort is being made to regiment and to regulate the whole life
of the American people." Jouett Shouse, Arousing Class Prejudices (Dec. 23, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE
DOCUMENT No. 84, at 5.
129. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 36, at 7 (asserting that the New Deal is making "each and everyone of us
a political and economic slave in the hands of the bureaucrats in Washington").
130. Id
131. See, e.g., Desvernine, supra note 5, at 3 (declaring that "we ... do not doubt that [the nation's]
fundamental and characteristic precepts are being now seriously threatened").
132. Desvernine, supra note 77, at 8.
133. Dawson, supra note 118, at 14.
134. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 18, at 295 (asserting that the Court's
decisions "challenged the President to run against the Court in the next election and seek to gain a mandate
from the People"); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 775, 787
(2003) ("It is credible to think that one pivotal Justice, Owen Roberts, was convinced to shift his position on
economic due process because of the signals sent by Roosevelt's landslide reelection based in part on his
campaign against the Court."); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775,
780 (2001) ("With the New Deal Court, President Roosevelt responded by campaigning against the Court and
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As this Section shows, the story is false. Roosevelt and his advisers considered but
135
rejected the suggestion to make the Supreme Court the focus of the reelection effort.
The truth is that Roosevelt did not need to campaign against the Supreme Court
because the Liberty League launched a massive campaign on the constitutional issue,
and the League made a much more compelling opponent than the Court. 136 Indeed,the
League made a perfect foil for Roosevelt to present the New Deal constitutional
philosophy. Campaigning against the Liberty League allowed Roosevelt to argue that

the expansive constitutional philosophy of the New Deal was necessary to protect the
American people from the representatives of entrenched greed, who perverted the
Constitution to promote a philosophy of greed.137 The dueling campaigns of Roosevelt
and the Liberty League presented the election as a choice between competing
constitutional philosophies, each of which were said by their proponents to embody
38
what it means to be American.1
A.

Roosevelt Made the Liberty League the Focus of the Reelection Campaign

Leading up the 1936 election, President Roosevelt and his advisers were
concerned that the constitutional validity of New Deal programs would become a major
campaign issue. From 1933 to 1936, the Supreme Court issued six major rulings
holding New Deal laws unconstitutional. 139 These defeats created major obstacles for
carrying out Roosevelt's plans and raised grave doubts about their wisdom and
validity. 140 Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's political adviser and Secretary of the Interior,

introducing his famous Court-packing plan.") This view is widely shared outside the academy. For instance,
anticipating that the Supreme Court would rule against the Affordable Care Act, Democratic Congressman
James Clyburn urged President Obama to run against the Court just like Roosevelt supposedly did. See Sam
Stein, Barack Obama Could Go After Supreme Court on Health Care, James Clyburn Suggests, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 2, 2012, 9:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/02/barack-obama-supreme-courthealth-care-james-clyburnn_1396375.html ("We have seen presidents run against Congress and we have seen
presidents run against the Supreme Court. Franklin Roosevelt did it to the Supreme Court[.]").
135. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of President Roosevelt and his
advisers' consideration and rejection of a campaign against the Supreme Court.
136. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roosevelt's campaign shifting its
focus to the American Liberty League.
137. See infra Part II.B.I
for a discussion of Roosevelt's attacks on the Liberty League as a force of
entrenched greed.
138. See infra Parts II.B.I-2 for a discussion of both sides' constitutional stances. See BASIL RAUCH,
THE HISTORY OF THE NEW DEAL 1933-38, at 233 (1944) (noting that the Supreme Court rulings were the
"main obstacle to the completion of the administration's program.").
139. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311, 316-17 (1936) (holding unconstitutional the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (holding
unconstitutional the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295
U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (striking down the Frazier-Lemke Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (holding much of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional);
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (invalidating a section of the National Industrial Recovery
Act).
140. See RAUCH, supra note 138, at 233 (noting that the Supreme Court rulings were the "main obstacle
to the completion of the administration's program.").
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urged Roosevelt to make the Court the central campaign issue. 14 1 Roosevelt rejected
the advice, apparently concluding that disputes over the meaning of the Commerce
Clause and General Welfare Clause raised issues that were too abstract for a national
campaign.' 42 Roosevelt agreed with Felix Frankfurter that the American people held
the Court in too high esteem and an attack on the Court would let his opponents portray
Roosevelt as radical. 143 This left the Roosevelt campaign in a quandary, wondering
how to address doubts over the constitutionality of the New Deal program without
challenging the Court's authority.
The American Liberty League was an unexpected gift. Early in 1936, the
Roosevelt reelection team came to the realization that the American Liberty League
gave Roosevelt the opportunity to make the case for the constitutional validity of the
New Deal against an opponent that was much easier to discredit than the Supreme
Court. 144 Postmaster General James Farley, who served as Roosevelt's campaign
manager, concluded that the League was "one of the most vulnerable ever to appear in
politics" because it was founded and managed by millionaire businessmen like the du
Ponts who were widely blamed for the Depression and who personally stood to gain
from defeating the New Deal. 145 Farley declared that the League should be called the
"American Cellophane League" because "first, it's a du Pont product, and, second, you
1 46
can see right through it."'
With the recognition that the American Liberty League was just what the
campaign needed, the Roosevelt reelection team decided to make the League the main
focus of the 1936 campaign. 147 As Farley later wrote, the "first 'battle-order' was to
ignore the Republican Party and to concentrate fire on the Liberty League." 48 Charles

141. See HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE FIRST THOUSAND DAYS
1933-1936, at 530 (1953) ("I told the President that I hoped this would be the issue in the next campaign. I
believe it will have to be fought out sooner or later, and I remarked to him that the President who faced this
issue and drastically curbed the usurped power of the Supreme Court would go down through all the ages of
history as one of the great Presidents.").
142. See RAUCH, supra note 138, at 233 (discussing Roosevelt's rejection of a campaign against the
Court because "it raised abstract and difficult questions of constitutional law, not easy to bring to life for the
electorate").
143. See SHESOL, supra note 26, at 145-46 (noting that President Roosevelt agreed with Frankfurter's
statement that "a general attack on the Court ...would give opponents a chance to play on vague fears of a
leap in the dark and upon the traditionalist loyalties the Court is still able to inspire").
144. See id. at 216 (noting that in early 1936, the Liberty League was "using their remaining ammunition to
shoot themselves in the foot").
145. See WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 210 (asserting that the vulnerability of the League stemmed from
the wealth and privilege of its supporters).
146. Democracy Saved, Farley Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1936, at L33; see also Farley Blasts
G.O.P. Critics of Roosevelt, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1936, at 8 (quoting Farley calling the League "an
organization of multimillionaires which is run as a subsidiary of the Republican National Committee.").
147. See WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 210-11 (stating that the administration was eager to brand the
Liberty League as a tool to advance the interests of the wealthy, and the administration ordered operatives to
concentrate their attacks on the Liberty League rather than the Republicans).
148. FARLEY, supra note 15, at 294; see also WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON
ROOSEVELT AND HIS LEGACY 103-04 (1995) ("Roosevelt directed the Democratic National Committee to
concentrate its fire not on the Republicans, but on such symbols of wealth as the American Liberty League,
associated by the public with the du Ponts of Delaware and J. Howard Pew, Jr., the Sun Oil Company
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Michelson, the director of press operations for the Roosevelt campaign, described the
strategy: "[I]t was not difficult for us to get and keep before the public the Liberty
League as the symbol of massed plutocracy warring on the common people. Thus the
Liberty League was an asset and not a liability to the Roosevelt forces."' 149 The
Roosevelt campaign did everything it could to keep the Liberty League in the news. As
'1 50
Farley put it, "[t]he more they [the Liberty League] work, the happier we are."
B.

The American Liberty League Allowed Roosevelt to Present the New Deal andIts
ConstitutionalPhilosophy as Essentialto the Protectionof the People

In countless speeches, advertisements, editorials, newspaper interviews, and even
a well-publicized Senate investigation, the Roosevelt reelection team mocked the
Liberty League as the voice of business tycoons who had long tyrannized the American
people and whose power the New Deal was instituted to check. In doing so, Roosevelt
presented the voters a choice between competing constitutional philosophies. On the
one hand, the League argued that the New Deal conflicted with foundational notions of
individual liberty and freedom from excessive government. In contrast, Roosevelt
presented a constitutional philosophy that emphasized social responsibility and
freedom from excessive industrial power.
1.

The 1936 State of the Union Address and the Attack on "Entrenched Greed"

The gist of President Roosevelt's response to the American Liberty League
became apparent in his first public comment on the League. The day after Shouse
announced the League's creation, Roosevelt told reporters that he "laughed for ten
minutes" after reading in the New York Times that the League was the answer to Wall
Street's prayers. 151 Roosevelt said he agreed with the League that property rights
should be protected, but the League emphasized property rights to the exclusion of all
other goals. 5 2 As Roosevelt put it, the League was like a church devoted to upholding
two of the Ten Commandments, while disregarding the other eight.' 5 3 Roosevelt
mocked the League's emphasis on individual liberty as a philosophy that only served
54
With
the interests of the moneyed class while ignoring the needs of the people.'
Roosevelt's rejoinder, it was anticipated that the Liberty League's campaign against the
New Deal could, in the words of the New York Times, "precipitate the greatest conflict
155
of constitutional and economic philosophy of the times."'
After his initial comments, however, Roosevelt did not address the American
Liberty League again until the 1936 State of the Union address, the speech that marked

tycoon.").
149. Charles Michelson, DemocraticStrategy Is Told by Michelson, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1936, at El 0.
150. Farley Back, UnworriedOver the Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1936, at I.
151. Roosevelt Twits Liberty League as Lover of Property,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1934, at 2.
152. Id.at 1.
153. Id.
154. As Roosevelt put it, the League "paid little attention to the commitment of government to help the
unemployed, to make work, to aid people in keeping their homes, to provide facilities for education and those
other factors summed up in the commandment 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."' Id. at 2.
155. CapitalExpects Smith Move Next in Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1934, at 1.

TEMPLE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 86

the beginning of the 1936 election campaign, in which Roosevelt gave a detailed and
forceful denunciation of the constitutional philosophy of the League. 156 It was the first
time that a President had delivered the address at night so that it could be heard on the
radio by the entire populace. 157 Roosevelt used the opportunity to give what was
perceived at the time as an extremely political speech, which made little attempt to
catalogue the state of the nation, but instead forcefully denounced his opponents as
representatives of "entrenched greed.' 58 Although Roosevelt did not mention the
American Liberty League by name, it was well understood to be the chief target of the

speech. 159
Roosevelt's central message was that New Deal opponents represented the forces
of "entrenched greed" who hid their true goals in patriotic and constitutional rhetoric,
and that expansive federal power was necessary to protect the people from these
forces. 160 Roosevelt declared that he had proudly "earned the hatred of entrenched
greed" because he recognized that it was "necessary to drive some people from power
and strictly to regulate others.' 161 His opponents sought to undo the New Deal,
Roosevelt warned, solely for their own benefit:
They seek-this minority in business and industry-to control and often do
control and use for their own purposes legitimate and highly honored
business associations; they engage in vast propaganda to spread fear and
discord among the people-they would "gang up" against the people's
62
liberties.1
Roosevelt warned his listeners not to be fooled by the patriotic, constitutional rhetoric
employed by his opponents: "They steal the livery of great national constitutional
ideals to serve discredited special interests."' 163 New Deal opponents, Roosevelt
warned, used patriotic language to hide their true purpose-to take away the people's
power to protect themselves from the tyranny of entrenched wealth.'M

156. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to the Congress (Jan. 3, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 8, 13-18 (1938).
157. Congress to HearPresidentin a Night Session Friday; He Seeks a 'Fireside'Chat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
1,1936, at 1.
158. Roosevelt, supra note 156, at 13-18.
159. See, e.g., F.D. Roosevelt, Jr., Weds Ethel du Pont in June, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1936, at Ml
(stating that it was publicly known that the term "economic royalists" referred to the "du Pont clan" and their
efforts to defeat Roosevelt's reelection through the American Liberty League); Roosevelt and du Pont Banns
Await Election, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1936, at 3 ("[O]f all the princes of 'intrenched greed' whom the New
Dealers revile the du Ponts are ones most frequently mentioned by name."); Roosevelt Condemns All Warlike
Countries; Defies His Critics to Repeal New Deal Laws; Demonstration Greets Belligerent Message, WASH.
POST, Jan. 4, 1936, at I (stating that although President Roosevelt did not directly mention the American
Liberty League, it was clear that his "caustic sallies" were aimed at them, among others); 'Stump Talk,' Say
Some Papers; 'Imperishable,' Others Declare, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1936, at 8 (identifying Republican
responses in the media describing the speech as an "aggressive" and "caustic" response to the American
Liberty League and other organizations set on "destroying Roosevelt").
160. Roosevelt, supra note 156, at 13-14.
161. Id.
162. Id.at 14.
163. Id.
164. Id.at 13-14.
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In the State of the Union address, Roosevelt asked a series of rhetorical questions
that amounted to a point-by-point response to the Liberty League's central assertion
that broad federal regulatory powers conflict with a commitment to individual
liberty. t 65 The Liberty League had argued that federal relief efforts undermined the
nation's commitment to hard work and individual responsibility., 66 Roosevelt
disagreed:
Shall we say to the several millions of unemployed citizens who face the
very problem of existence, of getting enough to eat, "We will withdraw from
giving you work. We will turn you back to the charity of your communities
and those men of selfish power who tell you that perhaps they will employ
167
you if the Government leaves them strictly alone?"'
The Liberty League had argued against federal power to address unemployment and
168
child labor, asserting that those subjects were governed exclusively by state law.
Roosevelt disagreed:
Shall we say to the needy unemployed, "Your problem is a local one except
that perhaps the Federal Government, as an act of mere generosity, will be
willing to pay to your city or to your county a few grudging dollars to help
maintain your soup kitchens?"
Shall we say to the children who have worked all day in the factories, "Child
labor is a local issue and so are your starvation wages; something to be
169
solved or left unsolved by the jurisdiction of forty-eight States?"'
The Liberty League had argued that federal protections for workers conflict with
individual freedom. 7 ' Roosevelt disagreed: "Shall we say to the laborer, 'Your right to
organize, your relations with your employer have nothing to do with the public interest;
if your employer will not even meet with you to discuss your problems and his, that is

165. Id.at 15-16.
166. See, e.g., Ralph M. Shaw, The New Deal: Its Unsound Theories and Irreconcilable Policies (May
31, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 39, at 13 ("The New Deal is nothing more or less than an
effort sponsored by inexperienced sentimentalists and demagogues to take away from the thrifty what the
thrifty or their ancestors have accumulated, or may accumulate, and to give it to others who have not earned it,
or whose ancestors haven't earned it for them, and who never would have earned it and never will earn it, and
thus indirectly to destroy the incentive for all future accumulation."); Jouett Shouse, Recovery, Relief and the
Constitution (Dec. 8, 1934) in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 7, at 12-14 (arguing that relief should be
handled by the American Red Cross rather than the government).
167. Roosevelt, supra note 156, at 15.
168. See, e.g., NEW WORK-RELIEF FUNDS, AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT NO. 117, at3 (Apr. 1936)
(declaring emergency relief violates principles of state sovereignty); WORK RELIEF: A RECORD OF THE TRAGIC
FAILURE OF THE MOST COSTLY GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIMENT IN ALL WORLD HISTORY, AMERICAN LIBERTY

LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 78, at 13 (Nov. 1935) (arguing that there is no express authority for the federal
government to spend funds on unemployment relief funds).
169. Roosevelt, supra note 156, at 15.
170. See NATIONAL LAWYERS COMMITrEE OF THE AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE, REPORT ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT iii (1935) (claiming that the National Labor

Relations Act was an illegal interference with employees' individual freedoms under the Fifth Amendment);
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 66, at 4 (Sept. 1935) (arguing

that the Fifth Amendment protects worker rights to choose any occupation and sell their labor on their own
terms, which was being subverted by the National Labor Relations Act).
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none of our affair?,,,1 71 The Liberty League had argued against federal power to protect
the elderly through measures like social security. 7 2 Roosevelt disagreed: "Shall we say
to the ... aged, 'Social security lies not within the province of the Federal Government;
73
you must seek relief elsewhere?"1
Through these rhetorical questions, Roosevelt argued that the Liberty League's
philosophy of individualism protected only the rich while turning the nation's back on
workers, the elderly, the homeless, and the unemployed. 74 While the central element
of the League's constitutional philosophy was that the Constitution protects the people
from government tyranny, the State of the Union address expressed the core of
Roosevelt's constitutional philosophy that the Constitution empowers the people to
protect themselves from economic exploitation. 175 The theme offered by Roosevelt in
the 1936 State of the Union address-that the New Deal was necessary to protect the
people from the forces of entrenched greed-crystallized the Roosevelt campaign's
response to the American Liberty League, and Roosevelt and his supporters repeated
76
these points throughout the campaign.1
2.

The Liberty League's Response to the State of the Union Address

Liberty League supporters responded with fury to the State of the Union address,
calling it "the most dangerous speech that ever came from a President of the United
178
States."' 17 7 They charged that the speech expressed "contempt for the Constitution"'

171. Roosevelt, supra note 156, at 15.
172. See Walter E. Spahr, The Fallacies and Dangers of the Townsend Plan (Jan. 3, 1936), in AM.
LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 85, at 8-18 (discussing the economic fallacies of the Townsend Plan, which
influenced the creation of the Social Security system); Townsend Plan 'Absurd,'Avers Yale Professor, WASH.
POST, Feb. 16, 1936, at M13 (quoting a Liberty League radio address that criticized the Townsend Plan as an
"utterly absurd" one that would result in bankruptcy and chaos).
173. Roosevelt, supra note 156, at 16.
174. Id at 15-16.
175. As William Forbath, a law professor at the University of Texas and one of the nation's leading legal
and constitutional historians, has argued, the New Deal constitutional philosophy did not consist solely of the
assertion of broad federal power to enact programs for economic protection; it also consisted of the assertion
that Congress had a moral and constitutional duty to do so. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in
Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 176-178 (2001).
176. At the Democratic National Convention, Roosevelt again declared that strong government action
was necessary to protect the people from the tyranny of the "economic royalists":
For too many of us the political equality we once had won was meaningless in the face of economic
inequality. A small group had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over
other people's property, other people's money, other people's labor-other people's lives ...
Against economic tyranny such as this the citizen could only appeal to the organized power of
government.
Text of Roosevelt Address, supra note 89, at 25. Roosevelt's convention speech likewise took up the argument
that his opponents hid behind lofty constitutional rhetoric: "In vain they seek to hide behind the flag and the
Constitution. In their blindness they forget what the flag and the Constitution stand for." Id.At the Convention,
James Farley likewise charged that the Liberty League used patriotic and constitutional rhetoric to instill fear
in voters: "I am forced to conclude that ... they hope to create a bugaboo to frighten the American voters."
Critics' "Bugaboo'Derided
by Farley,N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1936, at L33.
177. Roosevelt Fiscal Plans Go to Congress at Noon; Active Week Is Forecast,N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6,
1936, at 1.
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and was "an insult to the Nation and a desecration of its sacred principles. ' 179 No doubt
to the delight of the Roosevelt campaign, the Liberty League responded to the attacks
on corporate greed by defending big business:
[B]usiness is the source of the entire living of the people, of the wages of labor,
of the very food, clothing, and shelter of the nation.... It is high time that men
who live soft lives from taxation on business cease their attacks on the
institutions that make our civilization possible.1 0
Criticized as the embodiment of "entrenched greed," the League defended the
beneficence of wealth, declaring that "no country in the history of the world has ever
' 181
benefitted more than America from the concentration of capital."
The American Liberty League planned what was certain to be a dramatic response
to the State of the Union address: a nationally broadcast speech by Al Smith, the
Democratic Party's 1928 presidential nominee. 182 The speech would be given at a
dinner at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., and it would launch the League's
1936 election campaign. 183 The League's directors bet that Smith, known as "the
greatest apostle of the common people in America," would help the League shake off
the perception that it was the mouthpiece of millionaires.' 88 Leading up to the speech,
the newspapers eagerly anticipated the criticism that Smith would level at the
President. 185 The New York Times reported, "[flew events other than national
conventions staged by the two major parties have aroused keener political interestand concern-than the American Liberty League dinner here tonight which Alfred E.
Smith will address."' 186 In the days leading up to the speech, Democrats openly feared
187
that Smith would lead a revolt against Roosevelt from within the Democratic Party.
Others speculated that Smith would attempt to split the Democratic Party, with Smith

178. Id.
179. Guilty, BULL. OF AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, Jan. 15, 1936, at 1;see also Dispute Rages on President's
Night Message, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1936, at 2 (quoting a Liberty League statement accusing President
Roosevelt of fomenting class hatred and identifying his State of the Union address as evidence that he is
establishing a dictatorial system).
180. Neil Carothers, Time to Stop (Jan. 25, 1936), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No. 94, at 5.
181. George Barton Cutten, Entrenched Greed (Feb. 8, 1936), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE DOCUMENT No.
109, at 1,4.
182. Washington Dinner,BULL. OF AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, Jan. 15, 1936, at 2.
183. Id.
184. SHESOL, supra note 26, at 201. For instance, in October 1934, Father Charles Coughlin, the radio
priest who launched his own fascist-leaning movement against the New Deal, had criticized the American
Liberty League as the mere "mouthpiece of bankers," whose sole aim was to protect the value of their bonds.
Coughlin Assails Liberty League: Priest Calls Organization 'The Mouthpiece of Bankers' in Fight to Protect
Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1934, at L II.
185. See New-Deal Attack Preparedby Smith, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1936, at L6 (claiming that New Deal
proponents and opponents were eager to see how far the former governor would go in criticizing the Roosevelt
Administration); Ray Tucker, New Role Is Taken by Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1936, at E 12 (stating
that the buildup to Smith's address had aroused public political interest and concern equal to that of a national

convention).
186. Tucker, supra note 185, at E12.
187. See G.O.P. Primes Heavy Artillery for Campaign, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1936, at 9 (stating that
Democratic leaders were concerned about attacks from Smith).
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as the nominee of a Liberty League faction. 188 Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes
89
privately professed that Smith's speech gave the administration real reason to worry.
The speech promised great political theater because Smith had once been
Roosevelt's political mentor, and Roosevelt had nominated Smith for the presidency in
1928.190 Roosevelt had edged out Smith for the 1932 nomination, and Smith had since
turned against Roosevelt and the New Deal.' 9' Media attention increased when news
leaked that Smith had declined Eleanor Roosevelt's invitation to stay at the White
House the night of the speech, apparently out of concern that the Roosevelts would not
92
feel kindly toward him after they heard what he had to say.'
Broadcast nationally in prime time over the CBS radio network, Smith's speech
lived up to the hype. Smith charged that the New Deal was nothing less than an "attack
. . . upon the fundamental institutions of this country," and Roosevelt and the members
of his administration had betrayed their oaths to follow the Constitution.193 Smith
argued that Roosevelt was engaging in class warfare, pitting workers against
businessmen in an unconstitutional attempt to redistribute the wealth.' 94 Smith
threatened to "take a walk" on the Democratic Party if it nominated Roosevelt for a
95
second term. 1
According to Smith, the New Deal was incompatible with American values: "This
country was organized on the principles of a representative democracy, and you can't
mix socialism or communism with that .... They are just like oil and water, they refuse
to mix."' 196 Smith concluded by issuing a "solemn warning" that if the Democrats made
the mistake of renominating Roosevelt, the American people would have to choose
between the Constitution and communism:
There can be only one capital, Washington or Moscow. There can be only
• . . the clear, pure, fresh air of free America, or the foul breath of
communistic Russia. There can be only one flag, the Stars and Stripes, or the
flag of the godless Union of the Soviets. There can be only one national

188. See Scheme to Split Party Charged by Democrats, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1936, at 1 (quoting a
Democratic senator's prediction that the Liberty League would support a presidential campaign under the
name "Constitutional Democrats" with Smith as its nominee).
189. See ICKES, supra note 141, at 516-17 ("I am worried about the political situation ....Here is the
situation. Al Smith is to speak in Washington at a big dinner next Saturday night under the auspices of the
Liberty League. He has been getting a wonderful build-up for this meeting.... Smith is to have up to an hour
on a national hookup.... [E]very indication is that he is going after the Administration with a savage attack.
The whole country will be listening in and the newspapers will give wide publicity to the speech.").
190. Sidney Olson, Al Smith Opens War on His PoliticalPupil, Franklin D. Roosevelt, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 1936, at B3.
191. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 66, at 482-84 (stating that Smith favored a traditional role of the
Democratic party as opposed to a highly centralized federal government and thus advocated to restore policies
that made business leadership possible).
192. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 143; Smith to Decline White House Bid; New Attack Seen, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1935, at 1.
193. Text of Address ofAlfred E. Smith at Anti-New Deal Dinner in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1936, at 36 [hereinafter Address ofAl Smith].
194. Id.
195. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 152.
196. Address ofAl Smith, supra note 193, at 36.
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19 7
anthem, "The Star-Spangled Banner," or the "Intemationale."'
In the battle between traditional American values and the New Deal, Smith closed,
198
"[t]here can be only one victor. If the Constitution wins, we win."

Liberty Leaguers were thrilled. "It was perfect," Pierre du Pont declared. 199 The
League issued a statement proclaiming that Smith had succeeded in "dispelling the fog
200
over Washington," leaving no doubt about the fundamental crisis facing the nation.
Having long believed that the American people would rise up against the New Deal if
only they woke up to its un-American nature, Shouse declared that "the people have
20 1

awakened."

Republicans and conservative Democrats expressed strong agreement with Smith,
and in the immediate aftermath of Smith's speech, newspaper columnists speculated
that it might have turned the tide of public opinion against Roosevelt. 20 2 The New York
Times reported that "[t]he trend away from the New Deal has been easy to see for
months," and with Smith's speech it was now "highly possible" that the Democrats
would lose their hold on key states.20 3 Columnists speculated that Smith's threat to
2°4
"take a walk" might lead to mass defection by Democrats against the New Deal.
Commentators suggested that Roosevelt's defeat was a real possibility.20 5
New Deal Democrats expressed a very different reaction to Smith's speech, and
their reaction eventually carried the day. They were astonished that Smith delivered his
remarks at a black tie dinner in a resplendent ballroom attended by wealthy

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. WOLFSKILL, supranote 4, at152.
200. The Fog Dispelled,BULL. OF AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, Feb. 15, 1936, at 1 ("As a result of Governor
Smith's speech, the nation is no longer in doubt as to the issue confronting it - a choice between government
by a centralized, irresponsible, visionary and extravagant bureaucracy or by the orderly and constitutional
processes under the protection of which the United States has prospered far beyond any other nation in the
history of the world.").
201. Liberty Bloc Hints Drive to Enlarge, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 1, 1936, at 1.
202. Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York declared that Smith "takes exactly the same point of
view as the Republican Party .... There is not a single statement by Gov. Smith which I can not indorse
personally." Felix Bruner, New Deal Leaders in House Invite Smith to 'Take a Walk', WASH. POST, Jan. 28,
1936, at 2. Colonel Frank Knox, running for the Republican presidential nomination (and who was later
nominated as the vice presidential candidate), predicted that Smith's speech "unquestionably will have the
effect of swinging millions of Democratic votes to the support of the Republican ticket next fall." Id.
Welcoming Smith to the anti-New Deal fold, Governor Eugene Talmadge of Georgia predicted that he would
lead Southern Democrats to join Smith and Northern Democrats to block the renomination of Roosevelt as the
party's presidential candidate. Franklin Waltman, Jr., Al Smith 'ChangedAllegiance'inFace of Foe, Robinson
Says; Talmadge Supporters Gather, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1936, at 1.
203. See F. Lauriston Bullard, New England Takes Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1936, at E4 (suggesting
that Smith's Liberty League speech could help Republicans win in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut during the next election).
204. See, e.g., Arthur Krock, Smith's 'Walk' May Start New PartyAlignment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1936,
at 16 (postulating that Al Smith's departure from the New Deal Democratic party will likely lead other
Democrats to follow suit, causing a potentially permanent political divide).
205. See Olson, supra note 190, at B3 (remarking that "observers... are beginning to think for the first
time that the President can actually be defeated in the November election").
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businessmen, including twelve members of the du Pont family.20 6 The Washington Post
estimated that the leaders of the Liberty League attending the dinner had wealth
exceeding one billion dollars. 20 7 One congressman doubted that any of the attendees at
the Liberty League dinner "missed a meal during the depression." 2 8 Another
Democratic leader said, "Al Smith now stands for Millionaires' Row as against 'the
sidewalks of New York."' 20 9 Senator Joseph Robinson, Smith's running mate in 1928,
gave a nationally broadcast response and declared that Smith had discarded his
trademark brown derby for a "high hat."'2 10
Smith's speech spurred organized labor to increase their support for Roosevelt. 211
John Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers of America, condemned Smith for
speaking to a "billion-dollar audience of predatory financial interests," and he sought to
raise union dues to fight the League.2 12 The union quickly adopted a resolution
characterizing the League as the mouthpiece of millionaires "who have piled up huge
fortunes while denying their employees the right to organize," and denounced the
League as "wholly selfish in its aims, un-American in its methods and policies and
inimical to the interests of the people of the United States." 213 Other unions followed,
organizing their efforts to reelect Roosevelt by pointing to the Liberty League. 214 In
May 1936, a confederation of unions formed "Labor's Non-Partisan League," the sole
object of which was the reelection of President Roosevelt. 215 Labor leaders said that the

206. As the New York Times reported, "the popular reaction was strong among members of the
Democratic political community against the former Governor's new association with du Ponts and other
millionaires." Arthur Krock, President Works On Amid Verbal Barrage,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1936, at E3.
207. Franklyn Waltman, Al Smith Puts on Good PoliticalShow; Effect on Coming Election Problematic,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1936, at 2.
208. Bruner, supra note 202, at 2.
209. Notes Smith's Company, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1936, at 2 (quoting Eugene Connolly, president of
the Association of Knickerbocker Democrats, as he asserts that Al Smith does not speak for the masses of
Democratic voters).
210. Text of Senator Robinson's Reply to Ex-Gov. Smith's Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1936, at 12; see
also Meyer Berger, The High Hat Turns the Corner, Too: Its Devoted Cult Knows that Prosperity Is Here,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1936, at SM8 (discussing the significance of Smith's headwear).
211. See Lewis Hits Smith, Backs Roosevelt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1936, at I (stating that United Mine
Workers of America President John L. Lewis supported President Roosevelt and criticized Al Smith in a
speech endorsed by other labor groups).
212. Id. at 14; see also Smith Is Booed by 1,700 Mine Delegates Here, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1936, at I
(describing the thirty-fourth United Mine Workers of America convention where delegates pledged to support
President Roosevelt and the New Deal).
213. Louis Stark, Miners Warned on Guffey Act, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1936, at 5; see also Liberty League
Held 'Inimical' at Mine Parley,WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1936, at 2 (describing passage of a resolution criticizing
the American Liberty League at the United Mine Workers convention).
214. For instance, the head of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers called on labor to help defeat the
Liberty League and related forces, which "resent every attempt to give the workers either a new deal, a square
deal or any other kind of a deal, except a raw deal." Hillman Demands Vote for President,N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10, 1936, at 14. Roosevelt supporters also sought to rally African American voters to their side by pointing to
the Liberty League, saying that the League and its lawyers "are principally engaged in preserving the liberty of
a few men to wring their bread from the sweat of other men's faces." 26 Negro Rallies Back Roosevelt, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1936, at 4 (quoting Donald Richberg in his warning that placing control and power in the
hands of wealthy men endangers the liberty of the rest).
215. Louis Stark, Labor Chiefs Give Roosevelt Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1936, at 2.
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organization was necessary to counter the American Liberty League. 216 The new labor
league did not even mention opposition by the Republican Party.217 As one labor leader
later declared, the League was the true opponent, and the eventual Republican nominee
would merely be a "spokesman for the American Liberty League, a holding company
18
organized by the big interests and an institution that is a threat to our liberties.'2
The media attention on Smith's speech gave Democrats new opportunities to
mock the Liberty League's constitutional rhetoric. 219 One speaker denounced Liberty
Leaguers' penchant for invoking the Founders, saying that "they apparently think the
Revolution was fought to make Long Island safe for polo players." 220 A Democratic
senator said that the American people understood that the "liberty" advocated by the
221
Liberty League is "the liberty to exploit and profiteer upon the American people."
One congressman succeeded in blocking a bill to prohibit teaching communism in
federally funded schools by introducing, as a joke, an amendment to prohibit schools
from teaching the Liberty League's philosophy. 222 Both groups are radicals, the

216. See William V. Nessly, Senate to Study U.S. Fund Use for Campaigns, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1936,
at 1 (explaining that the labor league was created to counter the Liberty League); Stark, supra note 213, at 2
("We are neither afraid, bashful nor timid in our determination to the complete unmasking of the offensive of
the Manufacturers Association, the offensives of the Liberty League . . . or any other such organizations
formed to defeat the President.").
217. See Stark, supra note 213, at 2 (quoting the labor league's spokesman explaining the organization's
purpose and omitting any mention of the Republican Party).
218. Louis Stark, Asks Union Labor to Support Roosevelt, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1936, at 14 (quoting
Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America). At the Republican National
Convention, the president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers likewise described the Republican Party as
the "political agents of the Liberty League." LaborExecutives Criticize Speech, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1936, at
12. John L. Lewis said that Republican candidate AIf Landon was a puppet of the Liberty League and big
business. Lewis Declares Landon Is 'Puppet',N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1936, at 27.
219. James Farley described the League as the "center and soul of the predatory powers." FarleyScores
Liberty League as Anti-Social, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1936, at 2. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes declared
that the League was simply "an alias for big business." Ickes Says Hoover Aims to Stir Fear,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 1936, at 8. New York Mayor Fiorella LaGuardia declared, "God help this country when the unemployed
will be at the mercy of the Liberty League who would continue to feed the hungry on ticker tape, epigrams,
wisecracks and slogans." Mayor Backs WPA and Warns Moses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1936, at 31. One
Democratic senator called the League the "American 'Lobby' League," and said it was "composed in large
part of a group of griping and disgruntled politicians ....masquerading as patriots but in reality apostles of
greed." Harrison Hits Plan of Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1935, at 4; see also House in Uproaron
Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1936, at 2 (quoting an Ohio congressman's speech on the House floor that
"the only difference between the American Liberty League and the Communists is that the Communists seek
to divide all and the League seeks to take all"); Text of Senator Robinson's Reply to Ex-Gov. Smith's Speech,
supra note 210, at 12 (declaring that "[tihe list of directors and officers of the American Liberty League reads
like a roll-call of the men who have despoiled the oil, coal and water-power resources of this country").
Democrats frequently referred to the League as the "du Pont Liberty League." See, e.g., M'nutt Says Others
May ControlLandon, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1936, at 13 (demonstrating how Indiana Governor Paul McNutt
referenced the League as the "du Pont Liberty League"); 'Nonpartisan' Fight on Roosevelt Is Opened by the
Liberty League, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1936, at 17 (displaying how Farley referenced the League as the "crew of
the du Pont Liberty League" in discussing their financial support of the Republican ticket).
220. Eunice Barnard, Dr. Counts Assails 'Liberty's Enemies',N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1936, at 5.
221. Connally Defends New Deal, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1936, at 6 (quoting Senator Connally of Texas
in his critique of the American Liberty League).
222. James D. Secrest, House Blocks Rep. Blanton in Red Fight, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1936, at 13.
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congressman said, and "the only difference between the American Liberty League and
the Communists is that Communists seek to divide all and the American Liberty
League seeks to take all.

'223

Within a few weeks of Smith's speech, some commentators had cooled in their
assessment of its success, declaring that the speech had served to help both Roosevelt
and his opponents. 224 That perception did not last long. By April, the Washington Post
reported that Roosevelt's popularity had steadily increased following Smith's
speech. 225 By August, the Post stated what had become conventional wisdom: after
Smith's speech, the general public rejected the Liberty League because it had become
226
apparent that it was the "spokesman for special and selfish interests."
The negative reaction against the League that started with Smith's speech became
so strong that political commentators claimed that it was the turning point in the
election and marked the moment when Roosevelt regained popularity-leading to his
overwhelming reelection. 227 New York Times columnist Arthur Krock, who in August
1934 had called the Liberty League the answer to Wall Street's prayers, now declared
that it had been obvious all along that the League's campaign was bound to backfire:
"A political neophyte could have told the founders of the American Liberty League that
its concentration of du Pont backing, and its array of disappointed Democrats,
'228
threatened at the outset to turn it into a rich political gift to the President.
3.

Senator Hugo Black's Investigation of the Liberty League

The Democrats' coordinated response to the Liberty League was not limited to
speeches. On January 25, 1936, the same day that Al Smith gave his speech at the
American Liberty League dinner, Senator Hugo Black announced that he was
launching an investigation of the League. 229 By all accounts, Black's investigation was
a deliberate attempt to discredit New Deal enemies, and it proved quite effective. 230 It
by many as a key part
generated a great deal of media attention and has been credited
231
of the Democrats' strategy to undermine the Liberty League.
Black was chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Lobbying Activities,
which had been established in July 1935 to investigate unethical corporate lobbying

223. Id.
224. Franklyn Waltman, Administration's Strategy Believed Aimed to Keep AAA Substitute Apart from

Taxes, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1936, at 2.
EastAgain to New York State, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1936, at B 1.
225. PoliticalBattlegroundShifts
226. The Part of Wisdom, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1936, at X6.
227. See, e.g., Arthur Krock, Political Tide Turns Again to Roosevelt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1936, at E3
("The President's political ground-gaining seems to have begun after the American Liberty League dinner on
Jan. 25.").
228. Arthur Krock, Black CommitteeExposes the PoliticalPromoter,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1936, at 20.
229. Liberty League Is Target, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1936, at 37.
230. See, e.g., GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 48 (1977) (describing

how Hugo Black's investigation provided a key element in the Democrats' overwhelming electoral victory);
SHESOL, supra note 26, at 216 ("The League, by the late spring, was dying of a thousand cuts-many inflicted
by Hugo Black of Alabama, the relentless chairman of the Senate Lobby Investigating Committee.").
231. See, e.g., SHESOL, supra note 26, at 216 (arguing that the more investigating Black's committee did,
"the more ridiculous" the League appeared).
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against the Public Utility Holding Company Act (also known as the Wheeler-Rayburn
232
Act), a New Deal law that restricted the powers of holding companies. Many leaders
233
of the Liberty League had in fact lobbied against the Act. Yet it was immediately
apparent that Black's investigation of the League would not focus in any significant
23 4
The New York Times picked up on this immediately,
respect on lobbying activities.
describing the investigation as "[f]urther indication that the administration forces in
2 35
Black
Congress intend to wage war against the Liberty League and its membership."
set out to show that the business interests controlling the League secretly coordinated a
2 36
Echoing the President's State of the Union
variety of groups opposing the New Deal.
address, Black alleged that these groups sought to "conceal their sinister activities
23 7
behind lofty names and sonorous phrases.

Black's investigation succeeded in demonstrating that the Liberty League was
238
Liberty League backers had
deeply connected to other groups fighting the New Deal.
funded the fascist-leaning Sentinels of the Republic, which declared that "old line

Americans ...

want a Hitler" 239 and claimed that a "Jewish threat" was undermining

240
Black's investigation also showed
"the fundamental principles of the Constitution."
substantial connections between Liberty League backers and the Southern Committee
to Uphold the Constitution, which added race-based appeals to the charge that the New
241
Pierre du Pont and John Raskob had each given $5,000 to
Deal was unconstitutional.

finance the notorious "Grass Roots" Convention, organized by the Southern
Committee, at which thousands of copies of a photo had been distributed showing

232. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 225.

at 227.
233. Id.
234. Black's biographers have agreed with the assessment that the investigation of the Liberty League
was driven by politics, probably at the suggestion of the White House. See DUNNE, supra note 230, at 158
(arguing that the administration instigated the Black investigating committee as the presidential election
approached); WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 227 (suggesting that Black's committee was clearly investigating
more than merely lobbying activities).
235. Liberty League Is Target, supra note 229, at 37.
236. See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 185 (1994) (arguing that Black sought to

prove that the Liberty League's leaders artificially created New Deal opposition).
237. Saints and Sinners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1936, at 18 (quoting speech of Black). Catching the drift
of Senator Black's investigation, the New York Times asked, "What was the connection between these
organizations whose business it was to attack the New Deal?" WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 228.
238. See, e.g., House, 153 to 137, Rebukes Senate Lobby Committee; Bars Higher Counsel Fee, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1936, at 1-2 (noting the Senate Committee learned that Liberty League sponsors also financed
an anti-New Deal campaign); Say New Deal Foes Have Same Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1936, at 13
(providing evidence that the same contributors, including the Liberty League, financed multiple anti-New Deal
organizations). Liberty League President Jouett Shouse strongly denied that, even though the same backers
funded them all, each of these other organizations was merely "one of the interlocking branches of the Liberty
League." WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 233.

239. New Deal Foes Help Sentinels, Inquiry Is Told, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1936, at 5.
240. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 231, 233; see also New Deal Foes Help Sentinels, Inquiry Is Told,
supra note 239, at 5 (quoting letters from anti-New Deal organization leaders discussing the "Jewish threat");
Says Smith Spoke for Liberty League to Remove 'Taint', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1936, at 1, 4 (noting these
letters).
241. See Five Big Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1936, at El ("The Federal Government is working
consistently to tear down States' rights.").
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Eleanor Roosevelt being escorted to her car by two African American men,
accompanied by an editorial denouncing Franklin Roosevelt for inviting "Negroes to
come to the White House Banquet Table and sleep in the White House beds. ' 242 The du
Ponts apparently were untroubled by the distribution of these race-baiting materials. "It
is apparent they did not disapprove," the conference organizer testified before Black's
243
committee, because they contributed more money after learning of the photos.
As support for the Liberty League waned in the months after Smith's speech,
Black's investigation kept the Liberty League in the news, painting the League's
backers as shadowy figures funding and pulling the strings on a variety of radical
organizations that used constitutional rhetoric to attack the New Deal. 2 44 At Roosevelt
campaign headquarters, Democratic National Chairman Jim Farley no doubt had reason
245
to smile.
4.

The Roosevelt Campaign's Success in Portraying the Republicans as
Servants of the Liberty League

At the same time that the Roosevelt campaign was making the Liberty League
synonymous with entrenched greed, the campaign was making the Republican Party
synonymous with the Liberty League. 246 Campaign Chairman Farley declared that
"[t]he Republican National Committee has a little cry-baby brother, called the
American Liberty League. The brothers are always together. They pal around together,
they think the same thoughts, the[y] echo the same phrases and they seek the same
end. ' 247 As Farley charged, "whether they like it or not, the Republican leaders
represent the same forces of reaction that the Liberty League represents. They would go
back to the Old Deal and let those people run the country who presided over its
downfall. ' 248 Again and again, Democrats charged that the Republican Party was
242. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 177; see also 'Grassroots' Open War on New Deal; Boom Talmadge,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1936, at 1, 8 (reporting of the "Grass Roots" condemning Mrs. Roosevelt for being
escorted by African Americans).
243. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 242. The committee discovered that one anti-New Deal group, the
Farmers' Independence Council, was run directly out of the Liberty League offices and was funded by the
League. Id. at 239-40. In rhetoric almost identical to the Liberty League, the group called on farmers "who
wish topreserve their liberty and our present form of government" to rise up to preserve the "principles of
Americanism" against the radical, tyrannical policies of the New Deal. See James C. Carey, The Farmers'
Independence Council ofAmerica, 1935-1938, 35 AGRIC. HIST. 70,72 (1961); Anti-New Dealers Backed Farm
Group, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1936, at 1, 11. Black asked derisively: "Does Mr. Jouett Shouse devote much
time to farming?" Shouse Denies League Backs Farm Council, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1936, at X4.
244. See SHESOL, supra note 26, at 216-17 (noting several organizations that contributed to the League
and referring to them as "self-proclaimed defenders of the Constitution").
245. See id at 217 (stating that Farley "grinned" after being told by a reporter about the League's
activities).
246. See Franklyn Waltman, Jr., Foreign Affairs Stand Overshadows Domestic Issues as PresidentCalls
for Neutrality Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1936, at I (quoting President Roosevelt's address to Congress).
247. FarleyAsserts Administration Rescued Trade, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1936, at 1-2; see also Farley
Blasts G.O.P Critics of Roosevelt, supra note 146, at 1,3 (describing the Liberty League as "an organization of
multimillionaires which is run as a subsidiary of the Republican National Committee").
248. Farley's Address on National Issues Before Democrats at Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1936, at
18. Speaking at the Democratic National Convention in June 1936, Farley likewise charged that "[b]ehind the
Republican ticket is the crew of the du Pont Liberty League and their allies." Farley's Address to the
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249
merely a stand-in for the Liberty League.
The Roosevelt campaign was correct that Liberty Leaguers worked to elect the
Republican nominee Alf Landon. Few were surprised when Al Smith endorsed
Landon; and no one was surprised when Lammot and Pierre du Pont endorsed Landon,
making it clear that Landon had the support of the most well-known Liberty
Leaguers. 250 Indeed, the du Ponts were by far the largest contributors to the Republican
campaign, donating $144,000 to the Landon cause. 251 Late in the campaign, the New
York Times described Farley as "jubilant" over revelations that Liberty League
252
supporters had given large contributions to Landon's campaign efforts.
It was not merely the endorsements and financial backing of Liberty League
leaders that made it easy for the Democrats to portray the Republicans as puppets of the
American Liberty League. The philosophy and rhetoric advanced by the Republicans in
1936 echoed that of the League. 253 In January 1936, Liberty League executives said
they would actively support the Republican nominee if the Republicans adopted a
platform that advanced the League's policies. 254 Six months later, the party adopted a
platform that employed the same kind of constitutional rhetoric familiar from Liberty
League pamphlets. 255 Echoing Liberty League materials, the Republican platform

Delegates, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1936, at 14; see also Farley Scores Liberty League As Anti-Social, supra note
219, at 2 (quoting Farley describing the Liberty League as an ally of the Republican National Committee).
249. The Democrats alleged that the Republicans had chosen Alf Landon because "the DuPont Liberty
League crowd is less afraid of him" than other Republicans, so he was acceptable to the Liberty League.
Governor Is Recognized as Likely Opponentfor First Time, WASH. POST, May 21, 1936, at 6. In his keynote
address to the Democratic National Convention, Senator Alben Barkley called the American Liberty League
the Republican Party's "illegitimate brother." The Keynote Speech, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1936, at 16. At the
Convention, the Democrats portrayed the election as a choice between Roosevelt and the Liberty League. As
Pennsylvania Governor Earle put it, "The more the people realize and the more they keep in mind that the
issue is the liberalism of Roosevelt versus the big business fascism of the Liberty League the better it will be."
Leading Democrats Minimize Effect of the Conservative Group Bolt, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1936, at 12.
Throughout the campaign, the Democrats continued the assault on Landon as the puppet of the Liberty
League. See, e.g., Farley Deplores Campaign of Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1936, at II (arguing that
Governor Landon was essentially the American Liberty League candidate); M'Nutt Says Others May Control
Landon, supra note 219, at 13 (quoting radio address by Indiana Governor McNutt asserting that Republican
presidential candidate Landon was controlled by the American Liberty League); Robinson Derides Landon
Tax Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1936, at 4 (emphasizing that Governor Landon received generous campaign
funding from his Liberty League supporters).
250. See Comment Acrid on Bolt Threat of Smith Bloc, WASH. POST, June 22, 1936, at 2 (noting Al
Smith's support of Landon); Hamilton Asks Senate to Rush WPA Inquiry, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1936, at X7
(noting the du Ponts' endorsements of Landon); 'Remedy for All Our Ills', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1936, at 1, 5
(highlighting Al Smith's support of Landon).
251. See Du Ponts' $144,430 Tops Landon Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1936, at 10 (providing that three
members of the du Pont family were Landon's largest financial contributors); Hamilton Asks Senate to Rush
WPA Inquiry, supra note 250, at X7 (reporting that the du Ponts and their associates contributed $383,000 to
the Republican Party during 1936); $2,524,950 Spent by Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1936, at 10
(noting the du Pont family as among Landon's largest contributors).
252. Du Pont FundsAid Landon in Maine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1936, at 1,4.
253. Liberty League Tends Republican, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1936, at 37.
254. Id.
255. REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1936 (June 9, 1936), availableat http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=29639#axzzl xV5xdXfk.
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charged that the New Deal was un-American and unconstitutional. 256 It declared that
"America is in peril" because the New Deal "dishonored American traditions. ' 257 The
platform dedicated the Republican Party to preserving free enterprise and the
"American system of Constitutional and local self government. ' 258 Harold Ickes said
that Liberty League President Shouse must have served as a "wet nurse" for the
259
development of the platform.
In his campaign speeches, Landon took up many of the themes advanced by the
Liberty League. Although Landon had been described as a "practical" progressive
before he received the nomination, his positions during the campaign echoed the
constitutional nationalism of the Liberty League. 260 He argued that the "essence of the
New Deal" was "that the Constitution 'must go' in order to give men in Washington
'the power to make America over, to destroy the American way of life and establish a
foreign way of life in its place.' ' 261 Harold Ickes responded by giving a nationally
broadcast speech devoted to contrasting Landon's earlier progressive views with the
views he took during the campaign. 262 Ickes surmised that Landon had shifted to follow
"the lead of the American Liberty League, founded by the liberty-loving DuPonts. '263
Having accepted substantial campaign contributions from Liberty League leaders
and having adopted the League's constitutional rhetoric, the Republicans were slow to
recognize the political harm caused by the party's association with the Liberty
League. 264 The New York Times reported that the "political liability of the League was
so great by June that... Chairman Hamilton of the Republican committee would have
walked a mile out of his way rather than be seen in the company of a leaguer. ' 265 By

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.The Republicans' focus on the Constitution was a new development. The 1932 platform had not
presented the party's agenda in constitutional terms and had mentioned the Constitution only in relation to the
campaign to repeal the Prohibition Amendment. REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1932 (June 14, 1932),
availableat http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29638.
259. Ickes Doubts Unity of Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1936, at 4; see also Foes' Platform
'Contradictory' Says Wallace, WASH. POST, July 2, 1936, at X3 (quoting Secretary of Agriculture Henry
Wallace's claim that the Republican Party platform serves the "monopolistic industrial groups which are back
of the (American) Liberty League").
260. See Ickes Attacks Landon 'Anti-Dictator' Role, Citing 1933 Plea for Oil Control, WASH. POST,
Aug. 4, 1936, at X4 (describing Landon as a "practical" progressive and noting how his campaign positions
closely resembled the policies of the Liberty League).
261. Baltimore Crowd Cordialto Landon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1936, at 20.
262. For instance, before the campaign Landon had supported federal regulation of the oil and gas
industries but now argued that such regulation violated states' rights. See Ickes Attacks Landon 'Anti-Dictator'
Role, Citing 1933 Pleafor Oil Control, supra note 260, at X4.
263. Id; see also Text of Secretary Ickes Radio Reply to Governor Landon and Colonel Knox, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1936, at 12 (reproducing text of speech).
264. See Says Farley Is "Scared", N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1936, at 3 ("[Farley] would like to hang the du
Pont Liberty League crowd on our party, but he cannot do that for a minute" (quoting Rep. Lambertson)). The
Liberty League problem was apparent by the Republican National Convention in June 1946, when one
potential vice presidential candidate was eliminated from consideration because of his connection with the
Liberty League. Charles R. Michael, Cleveland Marks Turning Pointfor Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1936, at 61.
265. Arthur Krock, Liberty League Is Distinctly Pro-Landon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1936, at 18.
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the time of the Republican National Convention, Republican operatives feared that
open support by the League would hurt Landon. 266 Republicans begged the Liberty
267
League not to endorse Landon or to work openly for his election.
To comply with Republican requests to distance the party from the League, in
July 1936 the League issued a press release declaring that its opposition to the New
Deal was strictly "nonpartisan" and that the League endorsed no candidate. 268 No one
believed it. 269 Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace quipped that, although Liberty
League supporters "pretend that they are in no way identified with the National
Republican leadership their money is and so are some of their trained seals." 270 By
September 1936, Republicans realized that any association with the American Liberty
League was poisonous. 27 1 But by then it was too late. Thanks to the relentless
campaign of the Democrats to paint the American Liberty League as the spokesman for
corporate greed and to portray the Republicans as puppets of the League, the League
had become a liability that Landon and the Republicans could not shed.
C.

The American People'sJudgment

On November 2, 1936, Roosevelt won reelection in a historic landslide. He
received 60.8% of the vote to Landon's 36.5%, the largest margin of victory since the
uncontested election of 1820.272 Roosevelt captured the electoral votes of every state
except Maine and Vermont, giving him 523 electoral votes to Landon's 8, the largest
273
share of the Electoral College vote since the establishment of the two-party system.

266. Landon Packs Rodsfor Colorado Trip, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1936, at 13.
267. See, e.g., Krock, supra note 265, at 18 ("The Republican candidate and organization, feeling that its
implied endorsement and support are very hurtful, have made plain their wish that the League as a unit take a
position outside the party breastworks.").
268. See 'Nonpartisan' Fight on Roosevelt Is Opened by the Liberty League, supra note 219, at I ("The
leaders of the drive toelect Governor Landon are understood to have urged the Liberty League to stay aloof
from too close alliance with the Landon campaign."); see also Party Link Denied by Liberty League, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 1936, at 11 (providing League's statement that it did not endorse any party or candidate).
269. See, e.g., Farley'sAddress on National Issues Before Democrats at Albany, supra note 248, at 18
("But the Republican leaders seem very cold to them, for they realize that if they are found consorting with the
Liberty League the American people will think even less of the Republicans than they do now. And so the
Liberty League is making it more embarrassing for the Republicans every day. Republican leaders are asking
each other how they can get rid of the Liberty League."); Krock, supra note 265, at 18 (questioning how the
League can be nonpartisan when they clearly are against Roosevelt and the New Deal); The Part of Wisdom,
supra note 226, at X6 (declaring that, notwithstanding the League's expressed nonpartisanship, "[t]here is no
question, of course, about the league's anti-New Deal position" or that the group is "headed by a Democrat
openly hostile to President Roosevelt").
270. Declares Landon Offers Only Dole, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1936, at 42 (internal quotation mark
omitted).
271. See, e.g., Money in Elections, N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 12, 1936, at 16 ("The League's decision not to give
[contributions directly to Landon] ... was generally recognized as acceptance of the wholesome Republican
National Committee fear of official connection with the League which, for one reason and another, has
become a definite political liability.").
272. 1 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 375 (Michael Nelson ed., 2d ed.
1996); YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 100 (2001);

Leuchtenburg, supra note 19, at 2108.
273. MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 272, at 100.
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Of course, the results by themselves do not resolve whether the 1936 election
amounted to a popular mandate in favor of the New Deal constitutional philosophy. As
Barry Cushman has written, "election returns alone tell us no more than which person
or persons won."2 74 Nor does the fight between the American Liberty League and
President Roosevelt reveal the extent to which voters actually supported the New Deal
constitutional philosophy, rejected the League's philosophy, or gave any consideration
to constitutional issues. The sources relied on here-pamphlets, radio addresses,
campaign speeches, news articles, and editorials-reflect elite opinions and do not
show why the American people actually chose Roosevelt, whether it was because they
sought to endorse his constitutional philosophy or merely because they liked the cut of
his jib.
The meaning of an election, however, is socially constructed. It is not an
objectively determinable fact, and it is built more on public perceptions of what
mattered to voters than on what was actually in voters' minds. 275 The story of the
conflict between Roosevelt and the American Liberty League establishes that questions
of constitutional philosophy received enormous attention in the campaign, and the
election was presented to voters as a clash of competing constitutional visions. Key
participants in the election-Roosevelt, the Liberty League, Alf Landon, and countless
others-declared that constitutional issues were central to the campaign. Throughout
the campaign, they employed constitutional rhetoric and asked the American people to
take a stand on fundamental issues of constitutional philosophy. These participants in
the campaign believed that the election would resolve fundamental constitutional
questions.
At the time, the election results were widely understood as an expression of
overwhelming public support for the constitutional philosophy supporting the New
Deal and a repudiation of the Liberty League's contrary views. 276 The Democrats
naturally understood the election that way, a conviction they repeated throughout the
1937 fight over Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. 277 Many in the press also interpreted
the election returns in this way. 278 Republicans, too, apparently saw the election returns

274. Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in the
1930s, 50 BuFF. L. REv. 7, 10 (2002).
275. As political scientist Lawrence Grossback has written, "Whatever is going on in the minds of
voters, it may be that politicians sometimes interpret elections as carrying messages and then act on that
interpretation." Lawrence J. Grossback et al., Electoral Mandates in American Politics, 37 BRrr. J.POL. SC.
711, 711 (2007). In Grossback's formulation, an electoral "mandate" is not something that can be determined
by polling voters about whether they actually intended to send a particular message through their votes but
instead should be understood as "an agreement to regard a particular election as bearing a message." Id.
276. See, e.g., Pinchot Urges Party to Shed Rule by Rich, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1936, at X22
(explaining the meaning of the 1936 election results with regard to the Republican Party and its views).
277. Speaking in 1938, Chairman Farley declared that the 1936 election definitively repudiated the
Liberty League's attempt to "steer our people back to a reactionary system." Farley Ridicules Speech by
Frank, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1938, at 9.
278. See, e.g., Franklyn Waltman, Second Decisive Defeat in Two Campaigns Has Started Tongues to
Wagging Relative to the Future of the Republican Party, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1936, at X2 (concluding that
the "huge vote given to the President was intended as a rebuke to those financiers, industrialists and publishers
supporting the Landon candidacy" and endorsement of enlarged "social responsibility" of the federal
government). But see Landslide Vote Is Not Blanket Indorsement of New Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1936, at
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as a rejection of the Liberty League's philosophy. 279 After the defeat, the Republicans
abandoned the rhetoric of constitutional nationalism they employed in the campaign
and did not challenge the foundations of the administrative state again until the Barry
Goldwater campaign in 1964.218
The founders of the Liberty League also signaled their recognition that the
election was a repudiation of their views by effectively throwing in the towel after the
election. In the days following the election, the Liberty League put a brave face on the
defeat, vowing to continue operations. 21 Unprepared for the magnitude of the defeat,
however, the League drastically shrank its staff and decided to end its publicity
campaign. 282 A month later, the press was already asking: "What has become of the
league, anyway? 2 8 3 The election had made the Liberty League name toxic, and public
support by the League was now understood to undermine any cause the League would
support. 284 The next year, the League's leaders vehemently opposed Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan, but opponents of the plan begged the du Ponts and the Liberty League
not to play any public role in the fight against it, declaring that "[t]hey are black beasts
in the popular imagination and if they rally against the President, they are liable to
'
In 1940, the League closed down with little
make him friends instead of enemies."285
28 6
notice.
III.

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE

1936 ELECTION

The competing campaigns of the American Liberty League and President
Roosevelt shed new light on how the public came to accept the New Deal constitutional
philosophy. For decades, the relationship between law and politics has been a central
obsession of constitutional law scholarship, and the role of politics in the New Deal
constitutional revolution has been one of the main subjects of this obsession. A
mammoth body of scholarship has grappled with explaining how the profound changes
287
This literature
in constitutional doctrine associated with the New Deal came about.
B I (concluding that the personality of the candidates overshadowed the individual issues of the campaign).
279. See, e.g., Pinchot Urges Party to Shed Rule by Rich, supra note 276, at X22 (declaring that the
election results "proved 'beyond denial that the American people rejected the leadership of concentrated
wealth") (quoting former Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot)).
280. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview from One Perspective, 18
J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 6 (2009) (describing how Barry Goldwater revived conservatism as a "major
force in the Republican party").
281. See Liberty League to Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1936, at 14 (noting that the Liberty League had
no plans to limit its activities following the election); Liberty League Won't Disband,Shouse States, WASH.
POST, Nov. 13, 1936, at X7 (explaining that Shouse planned for the League to be just as active in the next
session of Congress following the election).
282. WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 247.
283. The Nation'sPassingShow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1936, at E9.
284. See WOLFSKILL, supra note 4, at 247-49 (describing the downfall of the Liberty League as a result
of the 1936 election).
285. Id. at 251 (quoting letter from William Allen White to James E. Watson).
286. Id. at 248-49.
287. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 58 (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
FOUNDATIONS] (asserting that New Deal Democrats were equal to the Founding Fathers in creating substantive
lawmaking solutions in the name of the people); ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 18, at 25 (noting
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focuses primarily on why the Supreme Court changed course in 1937 and stopped
striking down New Deal legislation. 288 Of central importance in this literature is how
the famous "switch in time" occurred, under which Justice Owen Roberts joined with
28 9
the dissenters to create a majority in favor of the constitutionality of New Deal laws.
As historian Laura Kalman explained, the central dispute has been between
"internalists" who explain the development as an evolutionary change in legal doctrine
and "extemalists" who point to political and economic events that persuaded the Court
290
to change course.
With the publication of the highly influential, yet highly controversial, We the
People, Bruce Ackerman declared that he sought to get past the intemalist-externalist
divide. 29 1 Ackerman argued that in the 1930s the American people themselves chose to
adopt a new constitutional regime, albeit without employing the Article V procedures
for formally amending the Constitution. 292 As Ackerman tells it, in 1936, after the
Supreme Court struck down key pieces of the New Deal, Roosevelt reconceived the
New Deal in constitutional terms and took the fight to the American people, who voted
overwhelmingly in favor of President Roosevelt's constitutional vision and against the
293
Court's.
The following year, chastened by the public's repudiation of its
constitutional views and under the threat of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, the Court
294
submitted to the will of the people.
The 1936 election thus is crucial to Ackerman's claim that the New Deal
revolution amounted to a "constitutional moment," in which the voters-or, as
Ackerman calls them, "We the People"--made a fundamental choice about the
meaning of the Constitution, effectuating their wishes not merely in the realm of
ordinary politics but instead creating a new "constitutional regime. ' 295 Ackerman
asserts that through Roosevelt's landslide victory the people endorsed the conception of
federal power underlying the New Deal: "If the American people were ever endorsing a
break with their constitutional past, they were doing so in the 1930'S. ' ' 296 The

the central importance of the New Deal transformations to modem constitutional development); BARRY
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 5-6
(1998) (asserting that the constitutional and jurisprudential changes during the New Deal era exemplified the
history of ideas more than the history of politics); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 19 (1996) (casting the Supreme Court's change in approach as approving a more active federal
government); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 233 (1995) (noting the Court's large amount of reversals of previous

decisions in support of the breadth of the "Constitutional Revolution of 1937").
288. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 287, at 3-7 (explaining the different conceptualizations of the
Court's decisions to stop striking down New Deal legislation).
289. Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, andthe New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2166-69 (1999).
290. Id. at 2165-66; see also Mark Tushnet, The New Deal ConstitutionalRevolution: Law, Politics, or
What?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1061-62 (1999) (book review) (describing "intemalist" and "extemalist"
perspectives).
291. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 18, at 343.
292. Id. at 268-69.
293. Id.at 306-11.
294. Id.at 333-37.
295. Id.at 309; ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 287, at 58-80.
296. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 287, at 53.
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"Roosevelt revolution," Ackerman asserts, should "be viewed as a constitutive act of
popular sovereignty that legitimately changed the preceding Republican
Constitution." 297 For Ackerman, the 1936 election demonstrates the people's central
role in adopting the new constitutional regime, declaring, "the language of popular
sovereignty provides an appropriate description for the constitutional transformations
298
achieved during this period.
Many scholars have sharply challenged Ackerman's claims about the role of the
American people in adopting the New Deal Constitution. 299 Terrance Sandalow wrote
that "it is doubtful that the People made, or can be shown to have made, the decisions
he attributes to them." 300 Larry Kramer likewise declared, "[t]he engaged public-the
'We the People' Ackerman celebrates-was never asked to adopt the broad principles
that come to define its new constitutional regime." 301 A central aspect of the case put
forward by Ackerman's critics is that Roosevelt did not actually campaign against the
Supreme Court. 302 As Michael Klarman pointed out, "Ackerman asserts that the 1936
election represented a popular mandate against the Court's constriction of the New
Deal. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of this thesis is that Roosevelt scarcely
mentioned the Court during the 1936 campaign." 30 3 Barry Cushman likewise declared
that "it is difficult to see how the Court could have construed the 1936 election as a
constitutional referendum" because "Roosevelt assiduously avoided raising either the
Constitution or the Court as an issue in his campaign." 3 04 Based on his conclusion that
Roosevelt stayed silent on constitutional issues during the 1936 campaign, historian
William Leuchtenberg rejects the claim that the 1936 election should be understood as
30 5
a referendum on the New Deal constitutional philosophy.

297. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 18, at 280 (second emphasis in original).
298. Bruce Ackerman, A Generation ofBetrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1522 (1997).
299. See, e.g., Leuchtenburg, supra note 19, at 2077 ("Scholars have dealt harshly with Bruce
Ackerman's audacious reconfiguring of American constitutional history.").
300. Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We the People, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 309, 329 (1992) (book review).
301. Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the
NewDeal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 885, 893 (1996).
302. See, e.g., Leuchtenburg, supra note 19, at 2084 (explaining that Roosevelt avoided campaigning
about the Court during the 1936 election).
303. Michael J.Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's
Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv. 759, 771 (1992) (book review) (footnote omitted); see
also CUSHMAN, supra note 287, at 27 ("Roosevelt assiduously avoided raising either the Constitution or the
Court as an issue in his campaign.").
304. CUSHMAN, supra note 287, at 27; see also Leuchtenburg, supra note 19, at 2084-85 ("The
President . . .deliberately avoided making any issue of the behavior of the Supreme Court in his bid for
reelection in 1936 .... Indeed, he did not mention the Court even once."). Indeed, strong evidence suggests
that Roosevelt expressly rejected the suggestion that he take his case against the Court to the American people.
See SHESOL, supra note 26, at 215 (describing why and how Roosevelt decided not to publicly oppose the
Supreme Court). Historians have written that Roosevelt followed the advice of Felix Frankfurter that "a
general attack on the Court... would give opponents a chance to play on vague fears of a leap in the dark and
upon the traditionalist loyalties the Court is still able to inspire." Id. at 145-46 (quoting letter from Felix
Frankfurter to Roosevelt, May 29, 1935).
305. Leuchtenburg, supra note 19, at 2087-88. But see ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 177 (1941) ("The claim later made that the Supreme Court had not been an issue in the
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As the story of the American Liberty League shows, both Ackerman and his
critics are mistaken about the constitutional issues actually raised in the 1936 election.
In Ackerman's view, the dispute pitted Roosevelt against the Court; Ackerman thus
describes his focus as "the conflict between the Old Court and the New Deal during the
1930's."306 As he asserts, resistance to the New Deal "came from the conservative
judiciary (that was] prepared to defend the property-centered constitution inherited
from the prior era."307 Ackerman does not mention the American Liberty League or
any other actors independent of the Court who opposed the constitutionality of the New
Deal. Instead, in Ackerman's conception, in 1936 the American electorate was asked to
mediate the conflict between the President and the Court because "Roosevelt had been
obliged to seek popular support in the face of a withering constitutional critique led by
the Court. ' 30 8 While Ackerman's narrative gives the people an important role in
mediating the constitutional conflict, he presents the conflict solely as an interbranch
dispute over issues of constitutional doctrine, issues that in fact were not raised in the
1936 campaign.
Ackerman's critics likewise characterize the constitutional conflict of the 1930s in
exclusively legalistic, Court-centered terms. Leuchtenburg thus asserts that whether the
1936 election really amounted to a constitutional referendum can be resolved by
addressing these questions:
Did Roosevelt raise the Supreme Court issue in the 1936 campaign-in the
Democratic platform or in his speeches? If he did not, did anyone else do so?
Did "the People" conceive of the 1936 election as centering on their attitude
309
toward the Supreme Court?
Like Ackerman, Ackerman's critics repeatedly equate the constitutional issue facing
the nation in the mid-1930s with the legal questions raised in the Supreme Court's
rulings striking down New Deal laws. 310 Ackerman's critics dismiss his account of the
New Deal revolution because they conclude that Roosevelt did not actually make a
campaign issue of the Supreme Court's constitutional rulings. If Roosevelt did not
actually ask the people to choose between his constitutional philosophy and the
Court's, these scholars assert, the 1936 election cannot plausibly be read as a public
311
endorsement of the New Deal Constitution.

campaign is unfounded. It was merely an issue on which the President had no need to speak-one which his
enemies could not win even by his default."). Michael Klarman, in contrast, rejects even the assertion that
Roosevelt's opponent presented a competing constitutional philosophy. See Klarman, supra note 303, at 771
n.76 ("Nor is it correct to suggest that the Republican presidential candidate in 1936, Alf Landon, rejected

activist government, thus presenting the electorate with a crystallized choice between competing conceptions
of national government power.").
306. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 18, at 280.
307. Id. at 267.
308. Id. at 311.
309. Leuchtenburg, supra note 19, at 2079.

310. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 287, at 26-27 (noting that the Supreme Court routinely struck
down legislation following the Democrats' success in the 1934 election); Klarman, supra note 303, at 771
(asserting that the 1936 election cannot be understood as a constitution referendum because "Roosevelt
scarcely mentioned the Court during the 1936 campaign").
311. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 287, at 27 (explaining that Roosevelt focused his campaign on
meeting the economic and social problems of society, not the constitutional philosophy of the Court).
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The history of the American Liberty League, discussed at length above, shows
that the 1936 election was in fact centrally fought over fundamental questions of
constitutional philosophy, 312 but it was not presented to the voters as a dispute between
Roosevelt and the Supreme Court.3 13 The dueling campaigns did not focus much
attention on the Supreme Court's constitutional rulings. Nor did the campaigns address
the construction of particular constitutional provisions. Yet, as this Article has shown,
Roosevelt did have a public opponent in 1936 that presented a sharply contrasting
constitutional philosophy-the American Liberty League, not the Supreme Court.
The constitutional rhetoric widely employed in the 1936 presidential campaignlike constitutional rhetoric in popular politics today-differs from the language of
constitutional doctrine familiar to lawyers. Scholars looking for constitutional
arguments in popular politics will usually find little that resembles lawyers'
arguments. 314 Lawyers and law professors may believe that the central constitutional
issues of the 1930s focused on the breadth of the Commerce Clause and General
Welfare Clause, and the degree of deference owed to Congress over the reasonableness
of federal laws-issues addressed by the Supreme Court in a series of landmark
decisions. 315 The constitutional rhetoric prevalent throughout the 1936 election
campaign, however, did not address these issues but instead focused on issues of
national identity. 316 Both Roosevelt and the American Liberty League understood the
Constitution to embody a set of fundamental values that they said form the core of what
317
it means to be American.
The dispute between Roosevelt and the American Liberty League illustrates how
constitutional rhetoric is the preeminent language in American politics for discussing
fundamental questions of national identity. While it may be impossible to know for
certain why American voters gave Roosevelt an electoral landslide in 1936, it is certain
that the issues upon which they were asked to cast their votes focused on questions of
national identity expressed in constitutional terms.

312. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of how Roosevelt presented the New Deal as a competing
constitutional philosophy to the Liberty League's philosophy.
313. See CUSHMAN, supra note 287, at 27 (explaining that Roosevelt avoided campaigning against the

Court).
314. See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN

AMERICAN CULTURE (1987) (tracing popular attitudes toward the Constitution).
315. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism and Polarization, I U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
63, 83 (2007) (noting the importance of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the 1930s in

shaping future Court opinions).
316. See Text of Roosevelt Address, supra note 89, at 25 (noting that Roosevelt stressed the meaning of
the Constitution in terms of national identity).
317. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of how the American Liberty League equated the Constitution
with Americanism, a set of values focused primarily on individual rights, most particularly property rights.
Roosevelt in turn argued that his opponents hid behind lofty constitutional rhetoric while ignoring the nation's
true values:
In vain they seek to hide behind the flag and the Constitution. In their blindness they forget what
the flag and the Constitution stand for. Now, as always, the flag and the Constitution stand for
democracy, not tyranny; for freedom, not subjection, and against a dictatorship by mob rule and the
overprivileged alike.
Text ofRoosevelt Address, supra note 89, at 25.
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CONCLUSION

This Article begins a project of tracing the history and significance of an idea, the
belief that the Constitution embodies national identity and makes us who we are. It is a
conviction repeated so often that it can often seem contentless and banal. It is intoned
by national leaders in our most solemn national occasions. 318 Without giving the matter
much scholarly attention, constitutional law scholars have been among the most
frequent purveyors of the mystical dogma that "we are the Constitution and the
Constitution is us." 319 The deeply felt conviction that the Constitution lies at the heart
of American national identity should be recognized as a distinctive ideology and thus
deserves its own name: constitutional nationalism.
Constitutional nationalism is understood by its proponents as an especially benign
form of nationalism, offering inclusion in the national community based on acceptance
of universal ideals, rather than on race, religion, or ethnicity.3 20 Yet constitutional

318. President Obama repeated this familiar dogma in his second inaugural address, declaring: "We
recall that what binds this nation together is not the colors of our skin or the tenets of our faith or the origins of
our names. What makes us exceptional-what makes us American-is our allegiance to an idea," an idea
embodied in the Constitution. Barack Obama, Second Inaugural Address, supra note 12.
319. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 12 (1999)
(declaring that the Constitution "constitutes us as the people of the United States"); Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism,96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1463 n.163 (1987) ("Thus, the most important thing that the
Constitution constitutes is neither the national government, nor even the supreme law, but one sovereign
national People, who may alter their government or supreme law at will."); Jack M. Balkin, OriginalMeaning
and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 463 (2007) ("Viewing the Constitution as our
Constitution constructs a collective subject with a collective destiny that engages in collective activities.").
Poetical declarations that the Constitution makes us who we are are not limited to left-leaning law professors.
Steven Calabresi, founder of the Federalist Society, agrees that the Constitution is what makes the United
States exceptional, and it lies at the heart of the American national identity. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining
City on a Hill": American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on ForeignLaw, 86
B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1397-1410 (2006); see also SHELDON S. WOLIN, THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST: ESSAYS ON
THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1989) ("A constitution not only constitutes a structure of power and
authority, it constitutes a people in a certain way."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political
Constitution, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) ("At a deeper level, however, the Constitution binds together
people living in geographically disparate regions and constitutes them as members of a single nation, united by
their understanding of themselves as fellow citizens with a shared political history and a common future.");
Duncan Ivison, Pluralism and the Hobbesian Logic of Negative Constitutionalism,47 POL. STUD. 83, 84
(1999) ("A constitution constitutes the People who in turn constitute it."); Palma Joy Strand, Law as Story: A
Civic Concept of Law (With ConstitutionalIllustrations), 18 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 603, 610 (2009) ("Our
national identity, grounded in our shared myths, thus leans heavily toward law, and the Constitution is a key
text in our collective story. This relationship is deeper than one in which we simply accept the Constitution and
let it guide us. Instead, it constitutes us-not only our government-in the literal sense of the word: 'We the
People' are created by the Constitution.").
320. See generally HANS KOHN, AMERICAN NATIONALISM: AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY 3-13 (1957). More
recently, Steven Calabresi exclaimed, "America is a special country because any person of any race from
anywhere in the world can become an American simply by believing in a certain set of ideas. Being an
American is a function of what you believe and where your loyalties lie. It has nothing to do with your race, or
where you were born, or who your parents or ancestors were." Calabresi, supra note 319, at 1414. Of course,
this claim is not true and never has been true in anything like a literal sense: the overwhelming majority of
Americans are American citizens precisely because of where they were born or who their parents were, and
they remain members of the community regardless of what ideas they believe. And those who are not born
citizens cannot become American "simply by believing in a certain set of ideas."
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nationalism always conveys a message of both inclusion and exclusion: those who do
not ascribe to constitutional values (whatever they are) are not true Americans, and
32
their ideas must be rejected as dangerously foreign. ' In the ideology of constitutional
nationalism, the Constitution represents the dividing line between what is truly
American and what is alien. The exclusionary message of constitutional nationalism
can be seen most clearly in political movements like the American Liberty League that
make adherence to a constitutional vision central to their mission. Members of the
American Liberty League did not merely believe that the New Deal was bad policy;
they believed that it conflicted with the bedrock American value of individual liberty
and was therefore un-American and unconstitutional. Eliminating foreign ideas that
have infiltrated into American culture and politics is the core message of constitutional
322
nationalism.
In 1936, the American electorate rejected the constitutional nationalism of the
American Liberty League in favor of the more expansive constitutional identity offered
by President Roosevelt. The story of the American Liberty League's contest with
President Roosevelt over the nation's constitutional identity thereby presents a twist on
the developing narrative of popular constitutionalism. Popular constitutional scholars
have shown that successful social and political movements are key movers of
constitutional change, and change occurs when these movements persuade significant
323
The Liberty
numbers of the public to adopt new constitutional understandings.
League, however, did just the opposite. Not only did the League fail to defeat the New
Deal, it helped generate a public consensus in favor of the New Deal. The League gave
Roosevelt a public opponent that kept constitutional issues in the news and gave him
the chance to argue that the philosophy underlying the New Deal was necessary to
protect the American people from the forces of entrenched greed lurking behind the
Liberty League. It may be only a slight exaggeration to say that opposition by the
Liberty League generated a consensus in favor of the New Deal Constitution.
While the American public rejected the Liberty League's constitutional
nationalism in 1936, that rejection was not, and of course could not, be permanent. The
1936 election made the Liberty League synonymous with entrenched greed, but the
philosophy and rhetoric of constitutional nationalism pioneered by the Liberty League
32 4
have become prevalent features of American politics. As later chapters in this story
321. See Paul J. Kaplan, American Exceptionalism and Racialized Inequality in American Capital
Punishment, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 149, 163-64 (2006) (noting the role of social exclusion in cultivating

American exceptionalism).
322. Steven Calabresi explained that Supreme Court citation of foreign law gives him a "sense of
horror" because "[t]he whole point of being Americans for many of us is that we are not Europeans; we are a
special people, in a special land, with a special mission." Calabresi, supra note 319, at 1398.
323. For instance, Reva Siegel's work has looked at the modem women's rights movement and the gun
rights movement as movements that changed constitutional culture and, with it, the consensus understanding
of the meaning of the Constitution, both inside and outside the courts. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and ConstitutionalChange: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1323, 1323-24 (2006) (describing how social changes influence how Americans view the Constitution);
Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as PopularConstitutionalismin Heller, 122 HARv. L. REv. 191,
192-93 (2008) (describing how the Supreme Court used both the original understanding of the Second
Amendment and more contemporary developments in its Heller opinion).
324. See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 7, at xii (noting how the origins of modem conservatism began with
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will show, subsequent incarnations of this ideology proved more lasting than the
Liberty League, and its philosophy has succeeded in surprising ways.

the Liberty League's reaction against the New Deal).

